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Abstract 
The democratization process of countries all over the world after mass uprisings differs greatly. Some 
countries are confronted with extreme violence, while others remain peaceful. This thesis examines 
whether the amount of violence during mass uprisings leads to a longer democratization process and less 
inclusive elections in terms of voter base. It looks at the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe which 
brought down the Communist bloc. The repercussions of the presence or lack of violence during the mass 
uprisings on the behavior of the population in each country is visible until this very day – with Romania 
and Bulgaria still struggling from subtle, but deep-rooted internal conflicts and discomfort with the 
concept of democracy, and Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia’s significant progress in 
the democratization process and gradual increase of substantially embracing democratic values.  
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Chapter I: Introduction and Methodology 
The terms ‘violence’ and ‘revolution’ are attached to one another in a lot of scholarly work in the field of 
political science. “Violence is as inseparable from revolution and counterrevolution as these are from 
each other,”1 writes Arno J. Mayer in his book “The Furies”. Also, David Bell’s book on “Resistance and 
Revolution” uses the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘internal war’ (first introduced by Harry Eckstein) 
interchangeably, defining them as the point in time when “resistance aimed at changing the entire system 
has become highly organized, violent, and wide-spread in participation”2. However, Bell wrote his book 
back in 1973 – before the wave of revolutions of 1989, the uprisings in Latin America at the end of the 
20th century and early 21st century, and most recently, the numerous revolts and resistance movements 
that swept the North-African and Arab region in 2011 and onwards. The nature of resistance has changed. 
Timothy Garton Ash talks about “the birth of a new genre of revolution, qualitatively different from the 
Jacobin-Bolshevik model of 17893 and 19174”5. As the means, degrees of violence, and outcomes of such 
forms of resistance differ over time, and as the ‘power of the people’ took new forms, scholars have been 
defining and redefining the terms that were associated with regime changes worldwide.  
The terms ‘revolution’, ‘mass uprising’, and ‘regime change’ are often used interchangeably, despite the 
differences between them. However, what all of them have in common is that they usually involve mass 
mobilization against an authoritarian regime and that they may involve violence. In a speech in Denmark 
in 1932, Leon Trotsky defined ‘revolution’ as “a change of the social order. It transfers the power from 
the hands of a class which has exhausted itself into those of another class, which is in the ascendant.”6 In 
his book “Study of Revolution”, Peter Calvert characterizes a revolution as “a process in which the 
political direction of a state becomes discredited in the eyes of the population, a change of government at 
a definite point in time by use or threat of force, [and] the program of change in political or social 
                                                     
1 (Mayer 2000) 
2 (Bell 1973) 
3 In reference to the French Revolution. 
4 In reference to the Russian Revolution. 
5 (Garton Ash 2009) 
6 (Trotsky 1932) 
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institutions induced by the revolutionary event”7. On the other hand, ‘uprising’ is considered “an act of 
opposition, sometimes using violence, by many people in one area of a country against those who are in 
power”8. The addition of the ‘mass’ to ‘uprising’ does not change its meaning, but rather amplifies the 
size of the people participating in the uprising. The literature suggests that a revolution can only be named 
as such when a complete shift in the system is witnessed after it occurs, while a tangible outcome is a 
feature less focused on when talking about an uprising. Most mass uprisings have been referred to as 
revolutions in not only the mass media, but also in scholarly work across the discipline; however, this 
label is usually misplaced. One of the most recent examples is the so-called Arab Spring. Shortly after the 
first protests broke out across various countries in the Middle East, people had already referred to them as 
revolutions, before any viable, tangible change had happened. Goldstone defines revolution as “an effort 
to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, 
accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine 
existing authorities”9. Hence, one could conclude that mass uprisings are a part of the revolutionary 
process, rather than a different form of rejecting the regime in power. 
The literature has also often resorted to the simple assumption that regime change automatically means a 
shift from authoritarianism to democracy10. But this assumption is far from what the word actually 
implies. ‘Regime change’ is “the replacement of one administration or government by another, especially 
by means of military force”11. Hence, it does not necessarily guarantee a shift to democracy and is almost 
limited to the presence of military force as a main catalyst for change. 
For this thesis, anti-authoritarian mass uprisings will be examined – namely acts of opposition and 
mobilization by many people in a country against an authoritarian regime. They do not necessarily ensure 
                                                     
7 (Calvert 1979) 
8 (Cambridge Dictionaries n.d.) 
9 (J. A. Goldstone 2001, J. Goldstone 1998, Goodwin 2001) 
10 (Gasioriwski 1996) 
11 (Oxford Dictionaries n.d.) 
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a change in social order, as Trotsky’s definition of revolution implies, and do not necessarily include 
military force.   
Bringing down authoritarian regimes and paving way for democracy to unfold through mass uprisings has 
been becoming more frequent – however, each country had to pay its own price. Some countries were 
confronted with extreme violence, while others remained peaceful. The question is: how does the violence 
induced – or the lack of it – during mass uprisings affect the democratization process after an 
authoritarian regime has been toppled? The aim is not necessarily to prove causation, but rather to 
examine the correlation between the variables at hand. 
The research question of this thesis is: How does the degree of violence in anti-authoritarian mass 
uprisings affect the duration of the following democratization process and the political participation of 
actors? Of course, not all mass uprisings lead to democracy; hence, this question focuses on those 
occurrences that actually result in a democratization process.  
The hypothesis at hand is that the more violence occurs during mass uprisings, the slower the 
democratization process and the lower the participation of all actors in the democratic processes that 
follow. Here, the independent variable is the “degree of violence”, while the dependent variables are “the 
duration of the democratization processes” and “the inclusive political participation of various actors”.  
Methodology 
The methodology used to examine the hypothesis will be purely comparative, focusing on qualitative and 
Medium N case-studies of violent and nonviolent mass uprisings. 
All cases used are countries that witnessed mass uprisings against authoritarian regimes and that became 
democratic later on. The conceptual and operational definition of the key variables below will explain 
how each of them will be measured: 
1. Violence:  
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Oxford Dictionaries defines ‘violence’ from a perspective of law, stating that it is “the unlawful exercise 
of physical force or intimidation by the exhibition of such force”12. For this thesis, I will rely on Gene 
Sharp’s operational definition, who explains that violence is the injury or death of persons – thus 
excluding property damage, for instance, as a form of violence, unless it leads to human casualties13.  
In order to be classified as either violent or nonviolent, case-studies were selected based on either the 
absolute and total lack of casualties, or the presence of a considerable amount of casualties. Whereas this 
may seem like a radical approach, it helps with establishing a clear cut between violent and nonviolent 
anti-authoritarian mass uprisings, and hence, adds credibility and foundation to the outcome and 
conclusion of the thesis. 
The number of casualties is calculated from both sides – the number of killed people on the side of the 
opposed regime and the ones on the side of the demonstrators and opposition. The more casualties, the 
higher the level of violence. 
Additionally, this thesis will not distinguish between violence triggered by either spontaneous causes, the 
breakdown of the law enforcement process, or violence that had been deliberately planned by the 
government or civilians14.  
2. Anti-authoritarian Mass Uprisings: 
For this thesis, the traditional definition of ‘uprising’ will be used, which is “an act of opposition, 
sometimes using violence, by many people in one area of a country against those who are in power”15. 
In order to be classified as an anti-authoritarian mass uprising, case-studies that were selected for this 
thesis have to fulfill the following criteria: 
 Mass mobilization of civilians against an authoritarian regime 
                                                     
12 (Violence - Definition of Violence in English from the Oxford Dictionaries n.d.) 
13 (Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action 1973) 
14 (Leiden and Schmitt 1968) 
15 (Cambridge Dictionaries n.d.) 
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 Going through a mode of transition 
 Total change of political regime and type of governance, and not just a change of 
government, aiming at a democratic regime 
3. Duration of Democratization Process: 
Before defining ‘democratization’, it is necessary to agree on a definition of democracy. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the minimalist definition of the term will be used, based on Robert Dahl’s conditions for 
democracy, in addition to Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl’s definition in “What Democracy is… 
and is not”. Democracy is “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions 
in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected 
representatives”16. Adding to that, Dahl specified seven conditions that need to be present in order for 
democracy to exist: the control of elected officials over government decisions, free and fair elections, 
suffrage for all adults, the right to run for elective offices, freedom of expression, freedom of information, 
and the right to form parties, interest groups, and independent associations17. 
‘Democratization’ is the process of moving away from military rule, one-party domination, or 
personalized dictatorship to democracy18. This usually occurs through mass mobilization and resistance. 
Political scientists have so far not come to a unanimous conclusion that specifies when the process of 
democratization can be rendered complete or successful. Here it is important to disaggregate the 
democratization concept into two aspects: transition (an interval between political regimes, during which 
procedures and exact strategies are still undefined), and consolidation (a point in time when democracy 
has become the norm, and is thus sustainable)19. 
                                                     
16 (Schmitter and Karl 1991) 
17 Ibid. 
18 (Carter 2012) 
19 (Munck, Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratization 1996) 
9 
 
The duration of the democratization process is the time calculated from the beginning of the anti-
authoritarian mass uprising, up until the country is considered a full democracy. The longer the 
duration, the slower the process. 
4. Level of Participation:  
Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie define political participation as “behavior designed to affect the choice 
of governmental personnel and/or policies”20, which means that this behavior needs to take place within 
the government guidelines and follow processes set up and defined by the regime in place. Although they 
do not include passive forms of political participation, civil disobedience, or even behavior that occurs 
beyond the sphere of government21, this conceptual definition directly serves the needed operational 
definition of the term for this hypothesis. Since I am looking at the political participation of different 
actors within a structure during the democratization process, it is not necessary to resort and consider 
forms of political participation that defy the official processes, like elections and party creation.  
This thesis will measure two aspects of political participation in the democratization process: the voter 
turnout and the inclusiveness of the elections after mass uprisings. 
Voter turnout will determine whether people were willing to participate in the elections in the first place, 
and thus, be part of the new political system. The turnout will be looked at in terms of the participation of 
all eligible voters, not just the actual number of voters. This will also show whether the acts of violence 
during and after the mass uprising intimidated voters and persuaded them to stay at home instead of 
risking their wellbeing by casting a ballot.  
Election inclusiveness will be measured by how many movements gained seats in the first elected 
parliament after the uprising to deduce the political orientation of the voters and whether they were 
intimidated by acts of violence to change their vote choice or not.  
                                                     
20 (Verba and Nie 1972) 
21 (Conge 1988) 
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The higher the percentage of voters, the more political participation by the actors. The more 
diverse and fragmented the outcome of the election, the higher the inclusiveness and participation 
of actors from various political ideologies and factions without fear for the voters’ wellbeing or – 
more dramatically – life.  
For instance, if a parliamentary election leads to the ruling party’s absolute majority in the house, this is 
considered an indication proving that the voter base was not diversified and that a certain segment of 
society with specific political ideologies had participated heavily, while the others had not. If the 
parliament is fragmented with no absolute majority and includes actors from different political parties, 
this is considered an indication proving that the voter base was diversified and that actors with various 
political ideologies participated, making the parliament more representative of the country it stands for.  
Measurement of variables 
The amount of violence, i.e. number of casualties, will be gathered by different news outlets and journals, 
depending on the case at hand. If several, contradicting numbers appear, the geometrical mean will be 
used to calculate the mean22. 
To evaluate the variables concerned with democratization and voter turnout, this research will rely on the 
Democracy Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit, the Polity IV Project, and the archives of election 
outcomes of the different countries.  
It is important to note that this thesis will not abide by the structural functionalism approach, formerly 
introduced by Thelda Skocpol, which does not draw the line between social and political revolutions23. 
This thesis will look only at the shift of political forms of governance and their implications, the amount 
of violence they inflict, and how the duration of the democratization process and the political participation 
are affected.  
                                                     
22 When statistics given are far apart in numerical value, the geometrical mean becomes the more correct tool to 
calculate the mean, than the normal calculation of an average. The calculation consists of the square root of the 
multiplication of both numbers.  
23 (Skocpol 1979) 
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The cases selected for this thesis will be the 1989 anti-authoritarian mass uprisings that brought down the 
Communist bloc in Eastern Europe – namely Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. 
As post-war nations and countries that were highly affected by the rebuilding and re-establishment of 
Europe after World War II, these cases were chosen based on their proximity to each other 
geographically, historically, and / or in the tools they used in bringing down the Communist bloc. The 
cases mentioned above include countries that are similar in terms of social constructs and economic 
conditions, and have actually moved on to be democracies down the line. The main difference between 
them lies in the amount of violence that was witnessed during the uprisings – while some of them passed 
peacefully and without casualties, others suffered tremendously. East Germany is not included, given that 
its political structure was different, as it was divided into two blocs under different mandates right after 
the war ended. While West Germany was already democratized by the time of the uprising in 1989, which 
resulted in unification and a six-month period of democratization, the Eastern bloc was under Communist 
rule. It would not be solid to compare the case to the other countries, although it would have greatly 
supported the hypothesis, as Germany’s anti-authoritarian mass uprising was peaceful, resulted in no 
casualties, and has been considered democratic ever since. 
These cases will be examined according to the number of casualties that occurred during and following 
the mass uprisings. The dependent variable of the democratization process will be evaluated according to 
Polity IV Project from the year of the uprising up until the latest available data. Since most of the 
statistics available in the Polity IV Project end around 2007, the thesis will also take the rankings and 
classification of the countries in the Democracy Index 201524 into consideration, in order to understand 
where these countries stand today. The voter turnout of the populations will be measured from right 
before the uprisings in 1989 – if applicable – up until the latest available election data, while the 
inclusiveness in elections will be examined according to the composition of the first parliaments elected 
after the uprisings, namely between 1989 and 1991. While some cases will be qualitatively and 
                                                     
24 Looking at whether they are full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, or authoritarian regimes. 
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descriptively presented, others will be looked at from a quantitative manner. The qualitative section will 
help in testing the causality, and highlighting and explaining the relationship between violence, the 
political development of the country and the political behavior of the people – if one exists –, while the 
Medium-N chapter will compile the statistics of the different cases to either prove or disprove the 
hypothesis.  
For the qualitative section, this thesis will compare the mass uprising in Poland to the one in Romania 
(both in 1989). Both countries brought down the communist regime around 1989, and had been under 
similar rule for quite some time before that. Both countries also started their resistance towards the 
Communist bloc early on, with one major difference: Poland witnessed a peaceful mass uprising and is 
considered one of the safest countries in Europe25 today, while Romania went through a transition of 
increasing violence, which can still be seen in the country’s crime rate today. Nowadays, Romania suffers 
from corruption, while Poland is considered a role model in fighting corruption and managing funds26. 
One of Romania’s latest civil unrests was recorded in 2015, when a fire in a night club killed 32 people 
and resulted in protests calling on the prime minister to resign. During these protests, symbols that were 
used in the 1989 anti-authoritarian mass uprising against former president Nicolae Ceauşescu were raised 
one more time, nearly 25 years after they had been first used27. Another wave of protests – considered 
“the largest protests Romania has seen since the fall of communism 27 years ago”28 – gripped the country 
in February 2017, when hundreds of thousands took to the streets to protest an emergency decree by the 
government which decriminalized corruption. Acts of violence were witnessed as 150,000 people 
protested in Bucharest and firecrackers and bottles were thrown at the police, after which five were taken 
to the hospital29. On the other hand, Poland has barely witnessed major unrest ever since the fall of the 
Communist bloc in 1989, partly because it enjoys a very strong, organized labor movement, as opposed to 
Romania. Poland is the home of the bloc’s first independent labor trade union Solidarity, whose 
                                                     
25 (Bureau of Diplomatic Security - Overseas Security Advisory Council 2016) 
26 (Institute of Local Development 2012) 
27 (Agence France-Presse 2015) 
28 (Moldovan 2017) 
29 Ibid. 
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cofounder and head Lech Walesa was the country’s president for the first few years after the Soviet Union 
crumbled. In December 2016, the first signs of civil unrest re-emerged after the government considered 
limiting media access to the parliament, although freedom of the press was seemingly unlimited ever 
since 1989 – a considered triumph to democracy for many Polish citizens30. Poland is also ranked higher 
than Romania in the Economist’s Democracy Index. Romania on the other hand is still considered a 
flawed democracy until 201531; its presidential elections had an average voter turnout of about 62%32, 
while its parliamentary elections stood at 59.5%33. The number of casualties that occurred during the anti-
authoritarian mass uprising of 1989 in Romania is disputed, ranging between 1,000 and 1,200, while 
initial claims stood at 60,00034. Fact is, political violence had caused deaths in 1989 and 1990 – but it did 
not stop there. According to John Gledhill and others, “throughout the 1990s, Romania's transition from 
authoritarianism was witness to repeated instances of intense collective violence”35. As violence led to 
frustration which led to more violence – as Freud had stated –, a smooth democratic process is not 
possible, especially when considering that Romania still falls under the category of “flawed 
democracies”. Digging deeper into the cases will provide a larger outlook on how violence and political 
development and behavior could be connected.  
The Medium-N section will compile the data of the different cases, and examine the accuracy of the 
hypothesis. In other words, it will test in how many violent cases the duration of the democratization 
process prolonged and the inclusiveness of political participation was low, and vice versa. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters, starting with the introduction and the methodology. Chapter II is 
dedicated to an extensive literature review focusing on the use of violence – or the lack of it – during 
mass uprisings, the differentiation between nonviolent phenomena, the implications of using violence 
                                                     
30 (Day 2016) 
31 (The Economist 2015) 
32 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance n.d.) Average of voter turnout in the presidential 
elections of 1996, 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2014. 
33 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance n.d.) Average of voter turnout in the parliamentary 
elections of 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. 
34 (Roper 2000) 
35 (Gledhill, States of Contention: State-Led Political Violence in Post-Socialist Romania 2005) 
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during mass uprisings on the duration of the democratization process, voter turnout, and inclusiveness in 
democratic processes, and lastly, the conceptual framework and the relationship between the variables of 
the hypothesis. The third chapter qualitatively examines the cases of Poland and Romania with regards to 
the hypothesis, while the fourth chapter examines the Medium N cases, namely Hungary, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Chapter V highlights the main findings of the thesis, while chapter VI 
brings the thesis to conclusion by looking at recommendations and limitations of the research. The thesis 
is followed by a bibliography and appendices.  
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Chapter II: Literature Review  
This thesis is heavily connected to contentious politics, as first introduced by Charles Tilly, who defined 
the term as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which 
governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties”36. Transitions from 
authoritarian regimes are widely covered in the field of not only political science, but humanities as a 
whole, including psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy etc. Gerardo L. Munck and Carol 
Skalnik Leff highlight the importance of examining these transitions by stating: “the very process of 
transition from authoritarian rule, independently of the conditions that generated it, helps determine not 
only the prospects of democratic consolidation but also the success of the transition to democracy in the 
first place”37. A transition is defined as the interval between dissolving the authoritarian regime and the 
establishment of a new one38. Scholars have largely agreed on four modes of transition from authoritarian 
to democratic rule, two of which are smooth, and two of which are violent and rapid. The violent, rapid 
modes include transition through collapse, in which opposition groups collectively bring down the 
incumbent regime but usually get divided after the fall, and transition through foreign intervention, in 
which foreign powers interfere to help the opposition to tackle the old regime and rebuild the governance 
process of the country again39. The smooth modes of transition include transition through cooperation, in 
which opposition forces lead the shift in power through mass support, and transition through conversion, 
in which the incumbents lead the shift by reforming and redefining electoral rules40. 
In the literature on nonviolence, scholars and activists are usually divided into two conceptual schools that 
could be considered complementary: the principled nonviolence approach and the pragmatic nonviolence 
approach. The principled nonviolence approach – mainly embodied in Mahatma Gandhi – advocates 
nonviolence based on religious, moral or philosophical grounds, condemning any other form of 
                                                     
36 (Tilly, The Contentious French 1986) 
37 (Munck and Leff, Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparitive 
Perspective 1997) 
38 (Stradiotto and Guo 2010) 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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resistance41. The success of the nonviolent campaign is not only measured by its outcome, but also by its 
journey, and is considered a way of conflict resolution that emerges from the internal, human 
development. The pragmatic approach is best embodied by Gene Sharp, who looks at strategies and 
techniques of nonviolent resistance and their effectiveness42, as best laid out in his conceptual framework 
of liberation, which is discussed further below. While the first school is based on the scholar’s or 
activist’s conviction of doing the ‘right’ thing by avoiding the use of violence, the second school is made 
up of those who believe in the strategic value of nonviolence in a conflict as opposed to violence, based 
on statistics of previous uprisings.  
In 1991, Adam Roberts wrote that Eastern European uprisings in 1989 have shown that “nonviolent 
methods have a greater importance than has been allowed for in many philosophies”43. However, they 
also showed that peaceful civil resistance is not necessarily the complete opposite of violence, let alone a 
substitute for it, as violence may “contribute to the conditions in which civil resistance can take place,” 
Roberts explains44. While the anti-authoritarian mass uprisings in Germany, Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia all passed rather peacefully, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s fates were different, as they had 
fallen victim to the use of violence before and/or during the uprising. Some scholars attribute the presence 
or absence of violence to the strength of the civil society and labor movements45, as well as the economic 
conditions, namely whether a country is a rentier or tax state46. This point will be further examined 
through the case studies in the coming section. 
Regarding the use of violence or nonviolence during mass uprisings, several authors tend to “equate 
revolution and the excessive use of violence”47. Samuel Huntington, for instance, interchangeably used 
the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘violence’ in some of his publications. He stated that revolution, like “other 
                                                     
41 (Dudouet 2011) 
42 Ibid. 
43 (Roberts, Civil Resistance in the East European and Soviet Revolutions 1991) 
44 Ibid. 
45 (Della Porta 2014) 
46 (Costello 2016) 
47 (Zimmermann 1983) 
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forms of violence and instability, […] is most likely to occur in societies which have experienced some 
social and economic development [but] where the processes of political modernization and development 
have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change”48. However, the more one delves into 
modern literature, it becomes evident that “it is not the use of violence which is characteristic of 
revolutions as opposed to other forms of conflict, but rather the consequences revolutionary activities 
have for the particular social infrastructure”49.  
Violence – in general – can be an instrument of political power, and falls into three categories: violence 
triggered by spontaneous causes, by the breakdown of the law enforcement process, or by being 
deliberately planned by the government or civilians50. As anti-authoritarian mass uprisings often brings 
upon social change, H. L. Nieburg states in his paper on “The threat of violence and social change” that 
“no system can hope to survive unless it can live with and adjust itself to the multitudinous threats of 
violence which are the basis of social change”51. Frustration and disappointment can quickly trigger 
violent acts by people who are emotionally involved in a cause, and the attitude is facilitated by the 
existence or emergence of ingredients of violent action52.  
The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions states that “political revolutions need not include violence, but 
the more fundamental the political and social change advocated by the forces of revolution, the greater the 
likelihood that violence will play a role in the revolutionary struggle and the larger the role will be.”53  
In general, it is believed that countries with a large disparity in power witness violent transitions, whereas 
in countries “where opposition groups and incumbents are relatively equal in power, […] transition tends 
to be characterized by bargaining and negotiation”54; hence, more peacefully. Kurt Schock claims that 
                                                     
48 (Huntington 1968) 
49 (Zimmermann 1983) 
50 (Leiden and Schmitt 1968) 
51 (Nieburg 1962) 
52 (Leiden and Schmitt 1968) 
53 (J. Goldstone 1998) 
54 (Stradiotto and Guo 2010) 
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“empirically, political contention is transgressive and there are rarely cases of purely nonviolent struggle, 
especially in non-democratic contexts”55. However, he is mistaken, as the following context proves. 
One of the most prominent studies on nonviolent resistance is Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan’s 
“Why Civil Resistance Works – The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict”, which looks at 323 cases 
between 1900 and 2006, in which masses in different countries called for regime change in a peaceful 
manner. They concluded that nonviolent resistance campaigns were twice as successful as violent 
uprisings in achieving their goals and emerge with democratic institutions56, tracing this back to the 
increased chances of loyalty shifts by security forces in nonviolent campaigns. The authors also explain 
that the democracies brought to life by nonviolent resistance are more sustainable and peaceful, and 15% 
less likely to relapse into civil war57, than those that were born by bloodshed. 
Donatella Della Porta asserts that the occurrence of violence in the 1989 anti-authoritarian mass uprisings 
in Europe mainly depended on the capacity of a regime to repress through controlling coercive forces, and 
the power and strength of civil society over ensuring the peacefulness of protests58. Looking at Europe 
and the MENA-region, the scholar highlights that the behavior of the military in a given country can 
influence the emergence of violence during mass uprisings and affect the way events unfold. Variables to 
consider here are possible splits within the military hierarchy, as well as foreign military intervention.  
Leiden and Schmitt also look at the factors that determine the degree of violence during anti-authoritarian 
mass uprisings specifically. They state that it is not only determined by its participants, but rather by the 
grain of violence that already exists in them. The authors explain: “Mobs do not deliberate, and the 
momentary, seemingly trivial, decisions made by any number of individuals in a milieu of chaos can 
produce the violence and bloodshed that all might otherwise abhor. […] where there already exist 
                                                     
55 (Schock 2003) 
56 (Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works 2011) 
57 (Chenoweth, The Success of Nonviolent Resistance 2013) 
58 (Della Porta 2014) 
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ingrained habits of violence, the more readily will the revolutionary power struggle splash over into 
incalculable, ungovernable, and destructive bursts of energy.”59 
As an anti-authoritarian mass uprising does not necessarily lead to violence, another question comes to 
mind which had captured the attention of many authors and scholars: Does violence lead to anti-
authoritarian mass uprisings? Leiden and Schmitt believe that the presence of violence in a community or 
society does not make an anti-authoritarian mass uprising more likely; however, if an anti-authoritarian 
mass uprising happens, it will be accompanied by generous amounts of violence60. 
The success of an uprising relies on three main factors: the effectiveness of the state, the organizational 
abilities and experiences of the opposition, and – most importantly for this research – the extent of elite 
power on the coercive apparatus61. Although the extent of power in the latter point is not the main focus 
of this research, it does shed light on the role of violence and the type of violence that might emerge 
during uprisings. It is not only the elite’s power over the coercive apparatus that makes all the difference, 
but the methods used by the coercive apparatus in reaction to the elite’s orders. If the elite order the police 
or the army or the guerillas – or any other coercive apparatus in any given context – to exercise violence 
against the masses, will these fractions obey the orders or will they refrain? If the apparatus resorts to 
violence, to which extents is it willing to go? Will it blindly obey and – for the lack of a better expression 
– go the whole nine yards in violently eliminating the opposition, whether in its constitutional or informal 
form, or will it at any point take a step back? These questions lead to even further variables that are 
relevant to the context, most importantly the reaction of those coerced against. 
But violence is not necessarily initiated from above. Della Porta explains that the accessibility of social 
movements to political opportunities – for instance political institutions and strategies – could determine 
how those movements act in times of protest against the regime. Jeff Goodwin mainly argues that violent 
                                                     
59 (Leiden and Schmitt 1968) 
60 (Leiden and Schmitt 1968) 
61 (Lawson 2015) 
20 
 
mass uprisings are a reaction to political oppression and violence from above62 – a generalization that is 
not necessarily deemed feasible, specifically when talking about violence. However, he states that “when 
normal channels of access to the political system are blocked, violence might be perceived as necessary, 
as there is no other way out”63. Goldstone echoes the argument by stating that revolutionary forces may 
use assassinations, kidnapping, or terrorist attacks to intimidate the regime and gain supporters64. 
However, he adds that “revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces alike can use torture to sow terror 
and demoralization and to obtain information”65. 
One of the early contenders of the relationship between revolution and force or violence was Karl Marx, 
followed by Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin. In Marx’ Amsterdam speech of 1872, he states that 
while some countries have institutions and systems that allow workers to gain their rights peacefully, 
other countries require force in order to lever revolutions and establish labor-reign66. However, Marx and 
Engels were considered somehow moderate when it came to the use of violence, as stated by Marx in an 
interview in 1871: “We must make clear to the governments: we know that you are the armed power that 
is directed against the proletariat; we will proceed against you by peaceful means where that is possible 
and with arms when it is necessary.”67 Lenin, on the other hand, started out as an opponent to the use of 
violence, and progressively developed into a firm, extreme supporter of the application of violence and 
even went as far as allowing terrorist activities of the masses “intended to arouse panic and fear amongst 
specific target groups”68. He stated: “Individual terroristic acts are impractical as a means of political 
strife. It is only a mass movement that can be considered to be a real political struggle. Individual 
terroristic acts can, and must be, helpful only when they are directly linked with the mass movement.”69  
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However violent or not an action is considered, scholars should not drift away from the fact that even 
unarmed resistance is a mean of coercion, as it threatens social, economic, political or physical sanctions 
in case its demands are not met70. Many scholars deal with nonviolence as a method that holds high moral 
grounds, while in the end, it mainly just differs from violent resistance in the use of actual physical 
coercion. The question that arises here would be how democratic nonviolence is, given that is in fact a 
method of coercion, but this is a topic for another paper. 
On a different note, nonviolent action sometimes leads to violent action, and vice versa71. History has 
shown that violent struggles sometimes shift to nonviolent methods, when the participants realize that 
their turn to aggression is not bearing much fruit. One example would be the struggle of Latvia against the 
Soviet Union72. In opposition to the Soviet occupation after World War II, the Latvians realized how their 
culture and language were repressed by the invaders, and launched guerilla tactics to fight the oppressors. 
It is estimated that around 40,000 Latvians73 were involved in guerilla warfare at the time, as part of the 
Baltic liberation movement of Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Latvia against the Soviet Union. In 1945 
and 1946 alone, over 10,000 people were killed, arrested or amnestied due to guerillas in Latvia74. 
Starting 1952, the violence seemed to be ineffective, and nonviolent methods started to emerge in order to 
strive for Latvian independence. Such methods included boycotting communist organizations and Soviet 
elections, refusing to speak Russian, defending the Latvian culture in communist institutions, and 
celebrating Latvian national days, as well as organizing an independence campaign. Throughout the 
years, marches and peaceful protests were met with arrests and media slander. Nevertheless, pro-
independence marches had reached 500,000 participants on a regular basis by 1989, and several anti-
communist movements emerged, harboring ties with similar groups in Estonia and Lithuania. Latvia 
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gained its independence in 1991 without suffering casualties after 195275. The case of Latvia highlights 
the possibility of turning violent uprisings into nonviolent ones. 
Another example for uprisings that toppled dictatorships by resorting to nonviolence after violent action is 
Iran, as Schock explains76. Iran’s Shah was supported by SAVAK, an internal ruthless security apparatus, 
which was faced by two guerilla underground movements called Fedayeen and Mujahhadin77. However, 
those guerilla movements and their tactics did not cause the Shah to fall. It was the rise of peaceful 
citizens who took the streets in protest, and organized boycotts and civil disobedience which brought 
about a revolutionary outcome, defined as “the transfer of state power from those who held it before the 
start of multiple sovereignty to a new ruling coalition”78. Despite the peacefulness of the uprising, the 
following period was marked with heightened violence and coercion under the rule of Islamist Ayatollah 
Khomeini, which supports the theory of how nonviolent uprisings bringing down dictatorships do not 
necessarily lead to democratic or peaceful regimes.  
 
  
                                                     
75 (Phalen and Rennebohm 2011) 
76 (Schock 2003) 
77 Ibid. 
78 (Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492-1992 1993) 
23 
 
Differentiation between nonviolent phenomena 
When talking about collective political action in contentious politics, there are three main forms of 
resistance: nonviolent protest (verbal opposition, demonstrations etc.), riots (sabotage, attempts to gain 
power) and rebellion (political banditry)79.  
Revolutionary phenomena arise due to a number of causes, according to the literature. It can start with 
changes in international relations and the dependency on external forces for internal development, shifts 
in client-patron networks, changes in regime vulnerability, and the presence or emergence of a systemic 
crisis, be it political, economic, or symbolic80.  
When looking at nonviolent action, the literature sets some characteristics that define the nature of such 
action in order to refute misconceptions. Kurt Schock states that nonviolent action is non-institutional, 
and should not be equated to inaction, submissiveness, avoidance of conflict or passive resistance81. In 
order to be considered nonviolent actions, such movements need to involve risk and consist of context-
specific “nonviolent coercion in contentious interaction between opposing groups”82. It could be legal or 
illegal and does not necessarily use institutionalized approaches, while suffering is also not essentially 
one of its main components83. Shephard states that nonviolent resistance requires patience, but is not 
necessarily deemed slower than other methods aiming to bring about the desired change84. 
While revolutions without violence are unusual, they tend to occur in “societies that have high levels of 
social and cultural cohesion and accepted political mechanisms for implementing and accommodating 
change”85. Same goes for revolutions where the threat of violence exists, but is not realized86, according 
to Goldstone. 
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Most studies on nonviolent anti-authoritarian mass uprisings focus on the tools used during the examined 
uprisings and their effectiveness in causing the change that is called for. Such tools are boycotts, refusal 
to cooperate, strikes etc. This can happen either through withdrawal of regime support (also called 
Gandhian Model), or through enforcing fair elections by active political participation (also labelled as 
Electoral Model)87. In his volume on “The Politics of Nonviolent Action”, Gene Sharp specifies four 
mechanisms of change that contribute to the success of nonviolent resistance of any form: Conversion - in 
which the opposed change their outlook and adopt the point of view of the nonviolent activists; 
accommodation - in which activists are granted the change they wanted without the utter conviction of 
those opposed; nonviolent coercion - where the opposed loses control over his tool of power through 
nonviolent means by the masses, and thus, change is achieved; and disintegration – where the opposed 
regime falls to pieces88. 
Of course, there is no clear-cut, universal methodology to resist political systems and safely, peacefully 
turn them into sustainable, consolidated democracies. In his book “From Dictatorship to Democracy: A 
Conceptual Framework for Liberation”, Sharp explains that even though his manual of how to topple 
dictatorships was based on a number of cases and countries, each country needs to “examine the validity 
of this analysis for their situations and the extent to which its major recommendations are, or can be made 
to be, applicable for their liberation struggles”89. While he asserts that fighting dictators will always bring 
casualties, but that his analysis should urge the leaders of resistance movements to aim for strategies that 
enhance their effective power, and decreasing the number of casualties90. His suggestion to countries that 
are aiming to bring down dictatorships in a nonviolent manner is to strengthen the oppressed population 
and its social groups and institutions, establish an internal resistance force, and have a strategic plan. 
Sharp has a very pacifist approach to the matter, repeatedly emphasizing that the nonviolent behavior 
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must emerge from within the revolutionary force, rather than being imposed on it from external factors or 
entities. 
Sharp explains that peaceful political defiance needs to consist of seven characteristics, in order to be 
successful, including leading dictators to err in judgement and action, sever the dictatorship’s sources of 
power, finding the regime’s Achilles’ heel91, effectively mobilizing the population, not accepting the 
means of fighting that the dictatorial regime enforces, make it hard for the regime to combat, and 
distributing effective power92. While violent confrontations use physical weapons, nonviolent struggles 
use psychological, economic, social and political weapons, which crystalize in about 200 methods, 
including “protests, strikes, noncooperation, boycotts, disaffection, and people power”93. These methods 
fall under three umbrellas: protest and persuasion (symbolic marches, parades etc.), noncooperation 
(social, economic, or political), and intervention (such as nonviolent occupation and parallel 
governments)94. Sharp explains: “The use of a considerable number of these methods – carefully chosen, 
applied persistently and on a large scale, wielded in the context of a wise strategy and appropriate tactics, 
by trained civilians – is likely to cause any illegitimate regime severe problems. This applies to all 
dictatorships.”95  
However, the most challenging part of nonviolent action lies in its sustainability and continuity. Violence 
can erupt at any second, as soon as one member of the nonviolent movement is aggravated, which then in 
turn can lead to mass violence in larger crowds, or when the power dynamics shift, either internally or 
externally. In Kosovo in the early 1980s, for instance, nonviolent tactics in the fight for independence 
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seemed useless, leading to the creation and increasing power of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which in 
turn led to the displacement of thousands, mainly Serbians96.  
But violence does not necessarily have to emerge from within the movement. The reaction of the state and 
its security apparatus – be it the police or military or other entities that support and protect the incumbent 
– could also bring about violence. Della Porta stresses this point by stating that “initial eruptions of 
peaceful protest [in the MENA region in 2011 and Eastern Europe in 1989] were unsuccessful in bringing 
about democratization, instead developing into either coups d’état or armed conflict”97. She adds that 
brutal reactions from the regime cause escalation and radicalization98, feeding into Freud’s theory that 
violence breeds violence. 
It is evident that most of the literature stems from the principled nonviolence school, painting a rosy 
picture of nonviolent action and glorifying, sometimes even overestimating, its effectiveness and 
efficiency. But one must understand that several nonviolent uprisings were crushed and completely 
eradicated by authoritarian regimes, such as Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Tiananmen 
Square protests in China etc., while others only partly succeeded, such as the Palestinian first intifada and 
the US civil rights movement99.  
Possible implications of using violence during mass uprisings on the duration of the 
democratization process 
After looking at how the literature dealt with violence and nonviolence in mass uprisings, and how 
nonviolent phenomena differ from one another and how they develop, it is time to look at how violence 
actually affects the duration of the following democratization process.  
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Hannah Arendt said it in 1969: “The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most 
probable change is to a more violent world.”100 Universally, violence is not considered a pillar of 
democracy. 
When talking about Albania, Louisa Chiodi states that “right up until its final days, the regime’s 
apparatus of repression had been very successful in preventing the emergence of open criticism, and not 
even the few people who, under the severe control of the secret services, could travel abroad did dare to 
openly challenge even the language of the system”101. 
Della Porta explains that weak civil societies are usually a characteristic of “violent uprisings and 
troubled democratizations”102, adding that protests in general are unlikely to ease the democratization 
process.  
Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud talks about the “displacement of aggression”, which results in a foundation 
underlying the frustration-aggression theory103. Aggression is a consequence of frustration, just as 
frustration breeds aggression. “The ending of political violence often raises the level of face-to-face street 
violence”104, according to John Darby in his book “The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes”. 
Violence can reoccur either as a result of militant group fragmentation, or in the form of either street 
violence or a rising crime rate105. However, this does not mean that violence is surely to reoccur after 
democracy has been consolidated – or as Dankwart Rustow stated: “The factors that keep a democracy 
stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence”106. After violence hits a country, it is important 
to reconcile among different parties and societal segments. In the early stages of conflict, there is a higher 
chance of success for mediators to settle between different political actors, because “attitudes and 
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perceptions have not hardened and parties are still willing to talk to each other,”107 according to Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall. If early mediation does not take place, external states may be needed in order to “fix” 
the situation, because they may be able to offer “the requisite political will and muscle required to bring 
parties to the table and to end violence”108. 
For violent resistance, Sharp uses the example of guerilla warfare and its possible effect on the 
democratization process that would follow a violent conflict or uprising. He states that “guerilla struggles 
often have significant long-term negative structural consequences”109, even if the guerilla struggle 
succeeds. The emerging regime is more likely to be more dictatorial than its predecessor, given “the 
centralizing impact of the expanded military forces and the weakening or destruction of the society’s 
independent groups and institutions during the struggle – bodies that are vital in establishing and 
maintaining a democratic society”110. Sharp continues with looking at coup d’états, which usually end 
with a maldistribution of power, allowing third parties, who might not be open to democratic reforms, to 
take control. The scholar’s underlying notion, which he does not explicitly address but which can be 
deduced from his works, is the uncertainty that follows violent eras. His main chain of thoughts is based 
on the “what if”-question, subtly implying that peaceful resistance is more organized and guaranteed to 
end in democratic consolidation – an argument that has been a focal point of debate amongst scholars in 
the discipline. However, he claims to lean towards Aristotle’s concept of how tyranny can lead to more 
tyranny, even if democracy is an objective111. 
After studying the counterinsurgency movement in Latvia in the 1940s and 1950s, Juri Dreifelds states 
that “one of the most important questions in the analysis of transitions is the nature of the original but 
abandoned system, because new systems inevitably carry residues and baggage from their 
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predecessors”112. In response to that, Sharp explains that nonviolent resistance can have positive 
democratic effects, as it allows the population to explore peaceful, democratic mechanisms to stand up 
against would-be dictators in the future113.  
Previous research also shows that the method of transition affects the sustainability and consolidation of 
democracy as a whole. Using survival analysis and propensity score matching, Bayer, Bethke, and 
Lambach argue that “the transitions that were induced by nonviolent resistance campaigns are beneficial 
to the survival of democracy”114 – meaning that the odds of a political regime maintaining democratic 
values and processes are higher if those were brought about by nonviolent tactics. This notion is based on 
how nonviolent tactics foster conditions that allow democratic survival, and make them less prone to 
breakdown115. 
Other factors that affect the consolidation of democracy are the establishment of democratic institutions, 
the strengthening of civil society and the willingness of the population to identify the rising democratic 
framework as historically legitimate116.   
The mentioned authors imply that the absence of violence ensures a faster democratization process, since 
nonviolence allows for the foundations of democracy to be established and may be able to ensure the 
sustainability – or consolidation – of democracy. 
Possible implications of using violence during mass uprisings on the voter turnout and voter 
inclusiveness in democratic processes 
In his book “Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions”, Ekkart Zimmermann points out that one must 
“consider the relationships between political violence, voting behavior as an expression of protest 
behavior, nonviolent strikes, suicide, alcoholism, and other forms of deviant behavior”117. Marx himself 
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described the existence of suffrage in the British political system in 1852 as a mean of revolution itself118. 
Suffrage equaled political power and strength for the majority of the stakeholders119, according to him. 
However, this view may not be necessarily shared by those involved in violent uprisings that are followed 
by a democratization period. Marx mainly refers to the British context at the time, where the majority of 
the population consisted of proletariats, giving them the chance to achieve political and revolutionary 
power through the ballot box.  
In “How Nonviolent Struggle Works”, Gene Sharp states that “violent revolutions and wars have been 
frequently accompanied and been followed by an increase both in the absolute power of the State and in 
the relative centralization of power in its hands”120. This supports the hypothesis: when absolute power 
remains with the state and power remains centralized, this rules out the active, fruitful participation of 
different political actors in the system, and prolongs the democratization process – that is if the process is 
not brought to a complete halt. However, the statement still remains too vague and broad to be considered 
an absolute fact. 
Tatiana Kostadinova, who looked at what affects voter turnout dynamics in post-Communist Europe, 
states that elections after liberalizations and in emerging democracies are accompanied by unlimited, but 
uncertain and unguaranteed choices121. This leaves it up to the citizen to react to the transitional 
environment – a decision that is very hard to make. Factors like on-spot enthusiasm after uprisings, 
election systems, number of competing parties, vote margins between parties, economic conditions and 
the size of urban population were all cornerstones of Kostadinova’s study. The main conclusion of the 
research could be summarized in that the “decline in mass mobilization of voters [can be] attributed to the 
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transitional dynamics”122, showing a trend of drop in voter turnout after the first free election. However, 
violence was not considered one of the pillars of transitional dynamics.  
Perhaps the answer lies in looking at why people vote in the first place. What moves them – vengeance, 
conviction, necessity of change, duty or other dynamics? Additionally, this section will look at why 
people do not vote in retrospect, to determine whether violence plays a role in the equation. 
When talking about rational choice theory, scholars came up with a few reasons that could push a citizen 
to vote, including the sense of duty123, risk aversion124, a will to consolidate and maintain democracy125, 
and the behavior of politicians and leaders126. These emerged from the notion that voting in itself is an 
irrational choice, given that the value of a citizen’s vote falls below the cost of time, energy and effort it 
bears, as supported by Downs’ equation of R = (B)(P) – C + D127, also known as the paradox of voting. 
Here, R stands for the citizen’s reward from voting, B represents the benefit that citizen will gain when his 
candidate wins, P is the citizen’s perception of whether his vote will make a difference or not 
(probability), C stands for the resources used by the citizen in order to vote (cost), and D represents the 
psychic satisfaction that the citizen will get after he casts his vote. The higher R is, the more likely the 
citizen is going to vote. 
André Blais and Robert Young conducted an experiment in 1993 during the Canadian federal election 
campaign, exposing students to a presentation about the paradox of voting and the rationale behind voting 
based on a cost-benefit basis. The students’ voter turnout decreased by 7% after the presentation, as their 
sense of duty declined128.   
In psychology, it is argued that an “individual citizen’s turnout behavior is a joint function of his or her 
social location, his or her psychological dispositions, the procedures involved in voting and events that 
                                                     
122 Ibid. 
123 (Riker and Ordeshook 1968) 
124 (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974) 
125 (Downs 1957) 
126 (Uhlaner 1989) 
127 (Downs 1957) 
128 (Blais and Young 1999) 
32 
 
occur at the time of each election,”129 according to Harder and Krosnick. As opposed to Downs, the 
scholars equate the likelihood of voting to (Motivation to vote x Ability to vote)/Difficulty of voting130. 
While Downs focused on the internal factors that affect voting behavior, Harder and Krosnick looked at 
how the external circumstances and pressures influence the citizen who is eligible to vote. While both – 
internal and external – dynamics are what make up a human being in the first place, none of them can be 
ignored or deemed less important.  
In completion to Downs and Harder and Krosnick, Wang argues that rationality and emotion both affect 
the decision to vote, but that “rationality plays a more important and consistent role in individual turnout 
decision than emotion”131. It is evident throughout the study that Wang mainly relies on Downs’ cost-
benefit theory, which heavily relies on how the outcome of the election will affect the citizen at hand. 
But where does violence fall into these approaches? Both Downs and Harder and Krosnick only consider 
violence to be a relevant factor when it is taking place at the time of the voting process. So those who feel 
threatened or unsafe during the time they’re supposed to head to the ballot box are less likely to leave the 
house and fulfill their so-called national, democratic duty. Supposedly, established democracies should 
not fall victim to such conditions, as on-election-day-violence is more likely to take place in dictatorships, 
authoritarian and hybrid regimes.  
However, even established democracies are witnessing a noticeable decline in voter turnout and interest 
in the recent years. Before and during the 2000 presidential elections in the United States of America, the 
Harvard Kennedy School launched a project entitled ‘The Vanishing Voter’, surveying almost 10,000 
respondents on a weekly basis on their voting intentions. The study found that “the period from 1960 to 
2000 marks the longest ebb in voter turnout in the nation’s history”132. Voter turnout stood at 63% of 
                                                     
129 (Harder and Krosnick 2008) 
130 Ibid. 
131 (Wang 2013) 
132 (Patterson 2003) 
33 
 
Americans in the presidential elections in 1960, while in 2000, the percentage dropped to 51% - a decline 
mainly attributed to media coverage, electoral reforms, partisan politics and candidate strategy133. 
As for Europe, voter turnout differs from one country to the next. By studying democratic elections in 35 
European states between 1944 and 2009, Pascal Delwit found four main trends in voter participation134; 
firstly, a bell-shaped trend, with the maximum turnout occurring in the 1970s and 1980s135; secondly, a 
linear downward dynamic136; thirdly a stable voter turnout137; and lastly repeated, scissor-like 
fluctuations138. Delwit attributes these trends in different states to “civic culture, changes in the political 
system, the size of the country, the essence of electoral systems, their possible transformations and, more 
generally, the terms of the institutional constraint”139. In the study’s conclusion, the scholar confirms the 
existence of a general decline in voter turnout – for 45 years, Europe’s average voter turnout ranged 
between 80% and 84%; however, in the 2000s, this average dropped to 69.1%140.  
So why do people refrain or abstain from voting? Most studies on the relationship between violence and 
voter turnout examine how criminal – rather than political – violence during elections affects the number 
of voters, instead of the effect of previously witnessed violence during uprisings. For instance, Trelles and 
Carreras reached the conclusion – by looking at Mexico – that those who are exposed to high level of 
criminal violence in their everyday life during the election period are bound to refrain from voting141. 
Powell supports this argument by stating that “high levels of voting turnout are quite strongly associated 
with lower levels of deaths by violence.”142 
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In her paper on violence and its effect on political behavior, Sandra Gutiérrez argues that criminal 
violence impacts a citizen’s decision to politically participate, the form of participation itself, and the vote 
choice143.  Her study and statistical evidence about Mexico from 2006-2012 proves that “violent criminal 
activity depresses electoral turnout”144. Her findings are complemented by those of Paul Collier and Pedro 
Vincente who examined the presidential elections in Nigeria in 2007. Those were accompanied by 
violence, not necessarily by the incumbents, but by separate factions. According to the study, “violence 
systematically reduced voter turnout”145. However, it was not only a reduced voter turnout that those who 
practiced violence aimed for. The study concludes that “voter intimidation works by lowering the turnout 
for other candidates, thereby increasing the share of the violent candidate”146. Hence, the main aim of 
pursuing the path of violence to control elections is not to merely reduce the voter turnout, but rather to 
decrease the chances of opposing parties to win. Subsequently, the inclusiveness of the elections is 
hampered, stepping against one of the main principles of democracy, namely providing an opportunity to 
all voices of the society to take part and shape the political future of a country. 
This argument is further discussed by Miguel Garcia-Sanchez, who not only looks at the effect of 
violence on voter participation, but also at vote choice. Regarding voter participation, the scholar 
concluded that areas or municipalities that were hit hard by violent contexts, voter participation as a 
whole decreased. Voters had decided to protect themselves from political violence by deciding not to 
vote, and potential candidates from the opposition abstained from running in the elections due to the lack 
of safety and mobilization efforts147. This reduced inclusiveness, as well as competition in the first place. 
The scholar argues that “individuals living under a violent context tend to adjust their political behaviors 
in line with the strategic objectives and ideological orientations proclaimed by the armed actor 
dominating the area”148. Looking at Colombia in 2005, Garcia-Sanchez states that the impact of violence 
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was directly linked to the balance of military power in different areas and provinces of the country. In 
places where right-wing paramilitaries had gained control and power, practicing violence prior to and 
during the election process, voters were more likely to cast their ballot in favor of a right-wing candidate, 
in order to protect themselves, and sometimes due to the lack of other electoral options. 
However, when delving deeper into the literature, the practice of violence prior to elections does not only 
aim to reduce voter turnout or change vote choices. It could also be used – on a local level – to scare away 
and displace certain ethnic sub-groups, like in Kenya in 2008149. The objective of such a strategy is to 
ensure a “more favorable electorate in a given locality”150 by simply and effectively evicting the citizens 
who could oppose those exerting violence at the ballots. This also makes it almost impossible for 
elections to be inclusive and truly representative of the society or the country’s population.  
Garcia-Sanchez also explains that those who abstained from voting in a violent context were in a way 
“resistant to the influence of a political context that is at odds with their political views”151, showing that 
they had refused to be part of a system that had come about by violence. Powell expands this argument by 
explaining that “not only does the influence of coercion on decisionmaking weaken the importance of 
democratic resources, but the failure of government to maintain order and security leads citizens to look 
more positively on authoritarian alternatives.”152 
Although it may seem thus far that violence is mainly used by those in power against their citizens in 
order to control the ballot boxes, several countries over the past and current century have witnessed 
opposition groups initiating and carrying out violent actions in order to delegitimize those in power. One 
of the most prominent examples of such acts occurred in the 1930s in the Weimar Republic in Germany. 
Violence and intimidation were strategic tactics used by the Nazis in order to make it seem like the back-
then government could not maintain order, to intimidate other opposing parties and movements like the 
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Socialists, and to portray themselves as the only alternative and hope to the current system and as the only 
option that may reinstate harmony153. This helped the Nazis gain power in the following polls and do 
away with democracy altogether – as per the will of the people. People voted in reaction to their fear of 
the violence which the current government could not contain, leading those who supported the regime in 
power to either change their vote choice or abstain altogether.  
Either way, whether violence was practiced by those in power or by the opposition, the legitimacy of the 
regime and the system as a whole suffers when surrounded by a violent context154. Some scholars define 
political legitimacy as the result of how a citizen is satisfied with the performance of the country’s 
political institutions in several areas155. If the population suffers from violence in its day-to-day life, it 
will surely not be satisfied with how the state is handling the situation. Miguel Carreras looked at Latin 
America to evaluate how violence affects a person’s state support, concluding that a citizen’s support for 
political institutions decreases when he/she faces violence. The scholar explains that this notion rests on 
three main reasons: firstly, citizens become “disenchanted” by the system since it cannot ensure public 
security. Secondly, those who become victims of the said violence or perceive it stronger than others lose 
faith in the judicial system, since it does not seem to hold those responsible for the violence accountable 
for their actions, let alone punishes them. Thirdly, violence ruins trust on an interpersonal level, leading to 
a drop in state support156. When these factors come together and legitimacy is undermined, people refrain 
from voting.  
The emergence of violence during elections defies the very foundation of a democratic system – namely, 
it obstructs the concept of free choice. “When authoritarian rulers resort to systematic violence against 
opposition candidates, civil society, and independent media outlets […] they may or may not succeed, but 
clearly they have stepped beyond the bounds of democratic politics,”157 as Andreas Schedler puts it in his 
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paper on the “Menu of Manipulation”. This tampers with the quality of democracy, political liberty and 
equality158. 
Conceptual Framework and relation between the variables of the hypothesis 
Before setting up a conceptual framework on how the variables of the hypothesis are linked or connected, 
it is necessary to clarify on which theories the following chapters and case studies are based. This thesis 
firmly stems from the argument that “the very process of transition from authoritarian rule, independently 
of the conditions that generated it, helps determine not only the prospects of democratic consolidation but 
also the success of the transition to democracy in the first place,”159 as Munck and Leff stated.  
It also uses what Sharp calls a pragmatic approach to nonviolent action160, out of belief in the strategic 
value of nonviolence in a conflict as opposed to violence, based on statistics of previous uprisings.  This 
is supported by Chenoweth and Stephan’s study on nonviolent resistance, which concluded that 
nonviolent resistance campaigns were twice as successful as violent uprisings in achieving their goals and 
emerging with democratic institutions161. However, this thesis does not simply assume that nonviolent 
uprisings will automatically lead to democratic and peaceful regimes, since history has refuted this notion 
several times162. 
This thesis also relies on Schock’s idea that nonviolent action should not be equated to inaction, 
submissiveness, avoidance of conflict or passive resistance163, and Sharp’s argument that nonviolent 
behavior must emerge from within the revolutionary force, rather than be imposed on it by external 
factors or entities164. 
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One of the pillars of reasoning of this thesis stems from Freud’s argument regarding the displacement of 
aggression, which stipulates that aggression is a consequence of frustration, just as frustration breeds 
aggression, causing a vicious cycle165. In addition to that, nonviolent tactics foster conditions that allow 
democratic survival, and make them less prone to breakdown166, as Bayer, Bethke and Lambach 
explained. 
So in summary and considering the literature and case-studies examined above, the reasons of why the 
occurrence of violence adds to the prolongation of the democratization process, a lower voter turnout, and 
a less inclusive election outcome can be summarized in the following: 
1. One overarching concept that would suffer under violence is the legitimacy of the democratic 
regime. Once the legitimacy of the system is considered questionable or even worse annulled, the 
structure of democracy in itself implodes or collapses. This could occur via multiple theories. 
Firstly, violence may not allow for democratic survival or consolidation since those affected by 
the violence during the transition may not view the emerging democratic system as legitimate 
since it is not holding those responsible for violent acts accountable. Hence, those affected by the 
violence may refuse to take part in the regime’s mechanisms, through voting for instance. 
Secondly, “democracies are legitimate only to the extent that they protect individual freedoms 
and handle perpetrators through the legal system,”167 as Håvard Hegre states. If authorities 
respond to threats too forcefully, this might undermine the legitimacy of the democratically 
elected administration and cause more upheaval, which would make it harder for democracy to be 
fully implemented and could stop potential voters from taking part in the elections that are 
supposed to establish the democratic system. Thirdly, once citizens feel that violence has become 
a frequent phenomenon in their country, they will start losing faith in the state and its security 
mechanisms, and consequently stop believing that it should be in power. Furthermore, once 
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citizens lose confidence in the legitimacy of the democratic system, they will start to commit 
themselves less and less to the rule of law, as seen in the continuation of violence in Romania 
specifically. In this process, democracy loses its appeal168, as a recent poll about the Romanian 
population’s attitude towards democracy showed that almost half of the population is nostalgic to 
the Communist rule. 
2. The most important factor in the effect of violence on the prolongation of the democratization 
process is connected to the behavior and characteristics of individuals in societies involved in 
violent transitions. Carl Cohen examined the psychological traits – namely habits and attitudes of 
members of a community – needed as dispositions for sustainable democracy to work. If these 
traits are not in place, institutions and structures cannot be efficiently put in place for democracy 
to happen or be implemented correctly, including constitutional rights, educational institutions 
and informational media169. The traits Cohen finds necessary for democracy to work are humans 
being conscious of their fallibility, experimentally minded, critical towards their leaders, flexible 
towards changes in their lives, realistic in order to be conscious of imperfection, compromising, 
tolerant, objective in order to deal with the facts, and confident about their capability of 
governing themselves170. Of course, it is impossible to find communities where all citizens follow 
these habits and virtues; hence, the author stresses that these characteristics need to be present in 
a good amount of people for a good time for democracy to work. If these findings are connected 
to the conclusion of studies dealing with the effects of political violence on the behavior and 
attitude of humans, it is noticeable that violence prevents the emergence of the characteristics 
needed for democracy to work. One of these studies is James Garbarino and Kathleen Kostelny’s 
study on the effects of political violence on Palestinian children’s behavior, which stipulates that 
the more political violence and family negativity increased, the more the children included in the 
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study were at risk of undergoing behavioral risks171. Gvirsman et al. found in their research on the 
effect of exposure to political violence on ideological beliefs that “adults and children who are 
exposed to higher levels of political violence in person show elevated feelings of threat, hostility 
toward the enemy, ethnocentrism, and support for war”172. These characteristics oppose the ones 
specified by Cohen – tolerance and ethnocentrism, realism and the notion of constant threat, 
compromise and hostility towards the enemy are all traits that do not go hand-in-hand. Hence, 
changing the mentality that was affected by violence and fear takes time. Despite popular belief 
that a habit or a trait can be changed or adjusted in 21 days, research suggests that it can take up 
to 254 days173, needless to say with variation from one person to another, in order to change 
behavior. While this might not seem like a very long time that would affect the duration of the 
democratization process, it is necessary to understand that the change in character we are 
examining is not just a habit of drinking more water or exercising – as studied in Lally et al.’s 
research – but rather the shift a societal mentality as a whole. Hence, in order for democracy to 
work, time needs to be taken to allow that shift to happen, and all resources and institutions in the 
society need to be geared towards supporting and accelerating this change. Looking further, the 
longer it takes to establish and root the democratic system in a country after a violent era, the 
more likely it is to inspire further violence174, which consequently prolongs the establishment and 
consolidation even further.  
3. Violence can tamper with the structure of society as so-called “baggage” and residue remains 
among the different societal segments and movements, leaving room for frustration and an 
unwillingness to cooperate or unite. While research in this field mainly focuses on the 
psychological impact of political violence on the victims and their families in terms of social 
adjustment, mental health and financial situation, non-governmental rights organizations like 
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Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are flooded with stories of victims of political 
violence and their families awaiting that justice be implemented and those who had done them 
harm be held accountable. In these instances, justice and revenge are concepts that are often used 
interchangeably. Roberto Posada and Cecilia Wainryb interviewed 96 Columbian children and 
adolescents about their moral judgements after their families had in one way or another been 
victims of political violence. They found that “contexts underscoring revenge might give rise to 
cycles of violence”175. Hence, the frustration that comes with the lack of implementing justice and 
possible lack of accountability or so-called “revenge” could contribute to the lack of confidence 
of those who had been affected by previous violence in the democratic system and consequently, 
they would not be willing to be part of the emerging political system.  
4. As stated in the previous sections, violence breeds violence. Paul Staniland states that the junction 
between violence and voting are the main challenge to what he calls “meaningful 
democratization”176. He adds: “Whether in the Philippines, Pakistan, or Russia, electoral 
competition is intertwined with violence: pro-state militias target the supporters of opposition 
parties; states use security forces to repress dissidents and intimidate the electorate; political 
parties build armed wings; insurgents attack voters and candidates; and local elites use elections 
as a front for pursuing feuds and rivalries.”177. This does not necessarily support the theory of 
voters disbelieving in the legitimacy of or losing confidence in the democratic, electoral system 
as a whole, but it does explain what would cause low voter turnout or a lack of inclusiveness of 
the voter base after a violent era, such as in Romania and Bulgaria. It would also explain a less 
diverse and fragmented outcome of the election, as those supporting the opposition or the entities 
that had stood against the regime against which the uprising took place,  would be intimated, 
threatened or even harassed, leading them to stay at home instead of risking their wellbeing by 
casting a ballot – again, as proven by the cases of Romania and Bulgaria. Once violence enters 
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the process of transition, “violence may have a negative impact by polarizing the electorate along 
conflict lines and in extreme cases lead to new outbursts of violence”178. The consequences on the 
electoral process, as laid out by Staniland, need to be considered and deemed viable in places 
where anti-authoritarian mass uprisings were accompanied by violence. Additionally, electoral 
violence “can influence both attempts at conflict management and the consolidation of 
democracy”179, according to Höglund’s study. 
In summary, once violence becomes a part of a mass uprising toppling an authoritarian regime, its effect 
on the behavior of the population and therefore, the establishment of democratic institutions should not be 
underestimated. This thesis showed that Bulgaria and Romania explicitly are taking longer to democratize 
and had more or less one-sided parliaments right after their violent uprisings in 1989. On the other hand, 
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (now Czech Republic and Slovakia) clearly overtook Bulgaria and 
Romania in terms of duration of the democratization process and the internal inclusiveness of their 
parliaments after their nonviolent uprisings in the same year. The repercussions of the presence or lack of 
violence during the mass uprisings on the behavior of the population in each country post-uprising is 
visible until this very day – with Romania and Bulgaria still struggling from subtle, but deep-rooted 
internal conflicts and discomfort with the concept of democracy, and Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia’s significant progress in the democratization process and gradual increase of 
substantially embracing democratic values. 
The following chapter will examine the two main case studies of this thesis – Poland and Romania – and 
evaluate how the variables of the hypothesis are affected by violence or the lack of it in each country.   
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Chapter III: Qualitative research – Case studies explaining the relationship between 
violence, election inclusiveness and duration of democratization (Poland vs 
Romania) 
Poland 
“The Soviet Union itself disintegrated in the face of predominantly nonviolent secessionist movements 
from the Baltic states to Central Asia,”180 according to Schock. The scholar uses Poland to demonstrate 
how nonviolent action was specifically successful in bringing down the communist bloc in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 and the few following years. Civil resistance against the post-World War II communist 
rule by the Soviet Union in Poland had started in the 1970s, causing a shift of mentality amongst the 
Polish population and Soviet party leadership, as well as aiding a peaceful transition181. The Central 
Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party had monopolized the country’s political sphere, not 
allowing pluralism to emerge. The Baltic ports had organized strikes in 1970 and 1971 in response to 
subsidy cuts that were implemented due to economic problems, discomforting the party and causing the 
replacement of some officials. The next milestone in Poland was set in 1980, when demonstrations spread 
in the country and the Solidarity movement came to life, leading the party to allow the formation of 
independent, noncommunist labor unions and free protest, before desperately imposing the martial law in 
1981. Solidarity included 9.5 million182 members in 1981, accounting to over 25%183 184 of the Polish 
population back in the day.  
It is worth noting that the civil resistance and discontent arose mainly due to economic circumstances 
such as price surges and rising national debt, rather than political conditions. The implementation of a 
communist bureaucratic system added fuel to the fire, giving way to corruption and veniality185. However, 
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Solidarity noticed that in order to implement economic amendments and programs, it had to aim for 
political reforms first. The Soviet Union decided to partly intervene in Solidarity’s rise in Poland, by 
supporting the Polish United Workers’ Party through the deployment of Soviet troops along the Polish 
border and announcing that the matter was the concern of all socialist states186. The martial law 
implemented in 1981 remained intact for seven years, during which a pro-Solidarity priest was killed – a 
move that ruined the chances of reconciliation the party had attempted a few years earlier with the release 
of political prisoners. Although the martial law had placed chains on Solidarity, it continued to mobilize. 
Strikes started intensifying in 1988, calling for the relegalization of Solidarity and the extension of 
political reform. The confidence in the party had been damaged, causing it to accept negotiation offers 
with Solidarity on pluralism within trade unions.  
In 1989, the party allowed pluralism for the upcoming parliamentary elections, in which Solidarity beat 
the communist party. Six months later, member of Solidarity Tadeusz Mazowiecki was elected as prime 
minister by the National Assembly, making Poland the only communist country with a non-communist 
government. Mazowiecki then put forward proposals calling for the formation of a new coalition 
government, dominated by Solidarity187. The Soviet Union had accepted the changes to the political 
system without firing a bullet. The pacted transition occurred with no casualties and the Polish People’s 
Republic turned into the Polish Republic.  
As of 2015, Poland is still considered a flawed democracy, due to drops in civil liberties and political 
culture188. The country achieved an average voter turnout of 57.4%189 190 in presidential elections and a 
turnout of 49.5%191 192 in parliamentary elections. Voter turnout did not significantly increase over the 
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years after the anti-authoritarian mass uprising, and were remarkably lower than before the 1989 fall of 
the communist regime. 
In a 1987 referendum in Poland, which actually aimed to assess the stance of the population towards an 
economic reform program, voters were asked: “Are you in favor of the Polish model of the profound 
democratization of political life, the aim of which is to strengthen self-government, widen the rights of 
citizens and increase citizens’ participation in governing the country?”193 The results showed that 69% of 
those who voted, equivalent to 46% of all eligible voters, were in favor of the statement194. In comparison, 
the second wave of the World Values Survey in 1997 revealed results that were more favorable of 
democracy. When asked which party the respondents would vote for if there were a general election 
tomorrow, 63.3%195 stated that they would vote for parties calling for a democratic system196. Hence, the 
Polish population’s support of democracy increased remarkably after the uprising of 1989.  
Romania 
As opposed to Poland, Romania had gone through its fair share of violence by trying to break free from 
the communist bloc in the second half of the last century, and had lagged in its democratization. The fall 
of the communist regime in Romania was one of the most violent of all anti-communist mass uprisings 
against the Soviet bloc197, and had been deemed the one with least revolutionary outcome198. Naming the 
events that occurred in Romania in 1989 has been a tricky affair. Labelled as an elite coup199 by some 
scholars, it was also considered a coup with a popular uprising200 by others, and deemed a revolution201 by 
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a few. Some even considered it “a blend of spontaneous revolt from below, conspiracy, and coup 
d’état”202.  
After the Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989, and Czechoslovakia brought about the Velvet 
Revolution, Romania started reacting to the communist rule over its country, partly encouraged by how 
the Soviet Union seemed not to interfere with the danger facing communist regimes in Eastern Europe. 
Following the examples of their neighbors, Romanian citizens took the streets of Timisoara in December, 
and brought about civil disobedience in protest against the dictatorial-personalist regime of Nicolae 
Ceaușescu. The president had ruled with repression enforced by the secret police, and his reign was 
considered a “personalized, sultanistic, neo-patrimonial, totalitarian neo-Stalinist regime”203. In March 
1989, some members of the regime accused Ceaușescu of “discrediting socialism, ruining the economy, 
and earning international condemnation over human rights issues”204, and the living standard in Romania 
had become one of the lowest in Eastern Europe205. The event that triggered the protests was the state’s 
attempted eviction of pastor László Tőkés, who had been calling for reform. In addition to that, Romania 
had been suffering from economic deprivation, suppression of wage demands, and a seven-day work 
week206. A crackdown by the security apparatus on the protestors killed tens and injured hundreds, but did 
not stop the revolt. Ceaușescu left on a state-visit to Iran, during which the military retreated and the 
demonstrators took over the city. A few days later upon his return, he started slandering the protestors in 
the media, and justified the physical coercion used against them by labeling it a “legitimate defense of the 
people’s socialist achievements”207, which definitely did not add to his popularity. He organized a rally in 
his own support, gathered by his security apparatus, but was in shock as the crowd all of a sudden chanted 
against him, and could not even be calmed or influenced by the president’s promise of a rise in minimum 
wage. Over the following weeks, tension heightened and marches spread, as protesters took over the 
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television building. Violent repression was used against the demonstrators without avail. Ceaușescu fled 
the country on the 22nd of December, and the Romanian television announced the abolishment of the 
communist regime, and the creation of the National Salvation Front led by Ion Iliescu. Iliescu was a 
former party ideologue who had refused Ceaușescu’s atrocious measures in the past, and promised the 
people a complete shift to democracy. Ceaușescu and his wife were executed by a firing squad on 
Christmas day – a move that was considered the eradication of hope for a counter-revolution and 
retributory justice208. 
The exact number of casualties that occurred during Romania’s anti-authoritarian mass uprising of 1989 
is disputed, ranging from 1,000 and 1,200, while initial claims were estimated at 60,000209. However, it 
did not stop there.  Although the communist regime had been ousted and the National Salvation Front 
promised democracy, Romania would not completely settle and recover. The Front turned into a party and 
resurrected some of the communist regime’s public figures amid massive opposition. Elections took place 
in May 1990, in which Iliescu won with 85%210, and the National Salvation Front obtained the majority in 
both houses of the Assembly211, with 66% in the parliamentary elections212. They had been accused of 
hijacking the anti-authoritarian mass uprising, but Iliescu heavily depended on intimidation and pro-
government miners213 in order to silence the opposing voices and restore order214.  
Iliescu kept opposing suggested democratic reforms by other parties and had made sure his party 
remained in power, even on a bureaucratic level215. He was not replaced until the elections of 1996.  
Political violence had caused the loss of many lives, and had contributed to the emergence of violence in 
the years to come. According to John Gledhill and others, “throughout the 1990s, Romania's transition 
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from authoritarianism was witness to repeated instances of intense collective violence”216. However, it 
was not only political violence that had plagued Romania. Ethnic violence against the Roma and the 
Hungarian minority in Romania had been spreading over the years, and in March 1990, several people 
died in clashes in Tirgu Mures – a town predominantly inhibited by Hungarians217. It was not until 
Romania joined the European Union in 2007 that documents and eye witness accounts about the violent 
transition period became available for scholars to study. That was when Gledhill updated his studies on 
what had been happening in Romania and its consequences, singling out the violence that took place 
during the country’s transition from communism as the key element that delayed the establishment and 
consolidation of democracy218.  
Until 2015, Romania was still considered a flawed democracy219, although its constitution “provides for a 
presidential-parliamentary system that, while endowing the presidency with substantial authority, also 
assigns the Parliament real power to monitor executive behavior”220. The presidential elections over the 
years had an average voter turnout of about 62%221 222, and parliamentary elections also stood at 62%223 
224.  
“Years of Ceaușescu-inspired distrust, suspicion, fear, and social atomization – by now [1990] deeply 
ingrained in people’s habits – stand in the way of developing tolerance for other opinions, which is 
essential to a functioning democracy,”225 according to Verdery and Klingman. The scholars here do not 
only refer to political opinions, but to conflicts regarding nationality and religion as well. The lack of 
tolerance brought about by repression and continuous violence in Ceaușescu and Iliescu’s regime 
embedded a notion in the Romanian society that vividly opposes the very basic requirements for 
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democratization and effective implementation of democratic tools and processes. Moreover, despite 
religious freedoms being protected by law and the state, society itself stands in the way of such rights. 
Additionally, the relationship between the population and the state had become complex, as many 
Romanians had reached a point where they “resist anything that resembles the construction of state 
power”226. 
Bruce O’Neill traces the roots of the lack of tolerance and the heightened crime rate to the communist-era 
practices. “From fascist prisons to Communist-era gulags227, Romania does not simply have a history of 
torture, but also an existing infrastructure conducive to its practice,”228 he states in his paper “Of camps, 
gulags and extraordinary renditions: Infrastructural violence in Romania”. 
While public opinion polls about democracy in Romania before 1989 are hardly – if at all – attainable, a 
recent poll by INSCOP Research conducted in 2014 revealed that 44.4% of respondents believed that 
living conditions were better during the Communist era, compared to 33.6% who claimed the opposite229. 
This number was higher compared to the poll conducted in 2010, in which 54% claimed that living 
conditions were better before the anti-authoritarian mass uprising, and only 16% said they were worse230, 
hinting at a possible nostalgia to Communist rule. This may imply that a considerable portion (almost 
half) of the population is not very fond of the way the country is governed at this point in time – noting 
that it is not democracy they yearn for, but rather Communism.  
Before starting to compare both countries according to the variables of the hypothesis, it is important to 
understand what might had led to the use of violence in Romania’s uprising as opposed to Poland. Here, 
looking at two factors is necessary, namely the economic conditions of the country before 1989 and the 
strength of civil society and labor movements.  
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Economic Conditions 
The economic conditions of a country can certainly affect how calls for regime change unfold. Here it is 
important to highlight the difference between a rentier state and a tax state. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo 
Luciani introduced the idea of the rentier state, which stipulates that governments that rely on rent-money 
are less likely to take a turn towards democracy, since the local population does not really have influence 
on the government policies, due to their lack of power in financial terms. The influence and power comes 
from above. On the other hand, government budgets that are relying on tax-money from their citizens are 
more likely to comply to the will of the people and local population, since the financial and economic 
power comes from below231. Rentier states are considered more prone to political violence, according to 
the literature in the discipline. The reliance of the state on external sources for revenue can lead to 
violence for a variety of reasons, one of which is the likelihood of rebel groups to use violence in order to 
gain natural resource wealth. Another reason would be the emergence of grievances in case rent revenue 
is used by the government or those in to suppress and / or ignore the population, which could eventually 
lead to violence. The third most common reason in the literature is the that the structure of rentier states is 
weak and vulnerable to violent challenges, due to a corrupt elite that uses revenues for personal gains 
rather than national interest or common good232.  
Prior to the 1989 uprising, Romania had turned into a rentier state. Before the 1980s, investment in 
Romania was directed at flagship industries, rather than consumption, leading to overproduction and 
severe saturation, as well as input shortages and underused capacity233. This led the country to become 
indebted to European counties, who provided Romania with the technology needed for its industrial 
development on credit. Throughout the 1980s, Romania had been a state of high sovereign debt and 
austerity policies. “When the price of oil and development finance went up abruptly in 1979, the low 
energy efficiency of Romanian industry pushed the country into a situation where debt levels became 
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unsustainable,”234 Cornel Ban wrote in his study “Sovereign Debt, Austerity, and Regime Change: The 
Case of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania”. Ceausescu decided to pay off foreign debt through taking on a 
loan by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the expense of worsening conditions of the local 
economy, and hence the well-being of the population, due to his conviction that debt and independent 
policymaking do not go hand-in-hand.  The IMF later on in 1991 described the situation as follows: 
“Ceausescu’s legacy was an economy plagued by inefficient industrial structures and an almost obsolete 
capital stock, a completely disorganized system of production and distribution, a collectivized agricultural 
sector, a decaying infrastructure, and a population whose living standards had been forced steadily down 
to a level where even basic necessities – food, heating, electricity, and medical attention – were hard to 
come by. There is little doubt that the initial obstacles to reform in Romania were far worse than those 
faced by other reforming East European countries.”235  
Between 1976 and 1981, Romania’s foreign debt increased from $0.5 billion to $10.4 billion, and from 
1980 until 1982, the country had to pay $6 billion to foreign creditors, needing 80% of its hard currency 
exports to finance foreign debt236. In early 1981, the IMF approved a $1.3 billion loan which did not go 
through in the end. Western banks also accused Romanian banks of the kitting of checks, leading to 
further requests for loans to be denied237. Arrears accumulated, reaching $1 billion by the end of 1981. 
But this was not the only consequence of the austerity measures. Living standards suffered a severe blow, 
the more the debt cycle intensified. Between 1981 and 1989, the supply of food staples and the production 
of consumer goods were nearly halved due to the necessity of collecting US dollar reserves. 
The austerity measures that marked the 1980s in Romania severely affected the distribution of wealth and 
failed to cover the basic needs of citizens238. A decrease in wages and the deprivation of consumption 
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caused minor mobilization in 1987, of which demands gradually turned from restoring the socioeconomic 
status pre-austerity to regime change. 
Although Poland and Romania were both in debt in the years prior to the uprising, each country chose a 
different path to deal with the economic difficulties. When faced with the possible adoption of austerity 
measures, Poland declined, while Romania enforced the austerity measures to a severe extent. 
Although Poland’s foreign debt multiplied several times between the years of 1972 and 1979 and  reached 
even higher levels than Romania, it chose to experiment with “alternative forms of property, economic 
coordination, and economic sourcing of political legitimacy”239 instead of taking on international credit. 
External debt had reached over $25 billion by the end of 1980, owed to governments and 500 foreign 
commercial banks240. In 1981, the country announced that it was unable to service the debts, causing 
uproar among the Western banking and financing institutions, as the country had above all not been a 
member of the IMF at the time. In 1981, national income had fallen by a quarter in three years, inflation 
had reached 15%, a third of income was not matched by goods in shops, a third of industrial capacity was 
unutilized due to a shortage in energy, and a labor surplus plagued the country241. This was followed by a 
martial law declaration in December 1981. In 1982, Poland and the creditors reached a rescheduling 
agreement. A Committee for Economic Reform was established, which brought about a reform program 
based on the democratization of planning and policymaking mechanisms, as well as self-reliance, self-
financing of enterprises, and self-management by workers242. Although the reform program was not fully 
implemented the way it had been envisioned and despite constant struggles between the regime and the 
opposition, it had saved the country from becoming a rentier state by strengthening internal positions.  
All in all, Poland was not considered as much of a rentier state like Romania, as it sought alternative ways 
to deal with the economic difficulties at hand, instead of throwing itself into even more debt.  
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Civil Society and Labor Movements 
As mentioned in the literature review, Della Porta and several other scholars believe that a strong civil 
society is key to a peaceful uprising, emphasizing that weak civil societies are usually a characteristic of 
“violent uprisings and troubled democratizations”243. One of the main differences between Poland and 
Romania is the strength of each country’s labor movements. 
Poland’s Solidarity had become the first established, independent labor union in a country under Soviet 
rule. As mentioned earlier, Solidarity included 9.5 million244 members in 1981, accounting to over 25%245 
246 of the Polish population back in the day. Solidarity itself came to life after the Gdańsk Agreement in 
1980, which came in response to 21 demands by the Interfactory Strike Committee (known as MKS). The 
demands had called for free, independent trade unions, a right to strike, improvement of economic 
decisions etc247. Given difficult economic conditions in the 1960s and 1970s, and a surge in food prices in 
the summer of 1980, workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk went on strike, and amid popular support, 
the government agreed to sign the Gdańsk agreement at the end of August 1980s. The founders of 
Solidarity had been actively involved in the MKS, and Solidarity went on to be a major movement in the 
political scene down the line. Poland had witnessed a “long-rehearsed civic discourse”248 before the 
uprising in 1989, unlike Romania. 
“Because of the late emergence of a working class, Romania had little experience with grass-roots labor 
movements,” Bachman wrote in 1989249. Romania had suffered a dwindling in labor reserves in the 
1970s, after it had invested massive capital and labor inputs into the economy after World War II. In 
addition to that, the growth of labor productivity slowed at the end of the 1970s, despite the government’s 
plans to double labor productivity by 1990. Productivity took a hit due to economic centralization, the 
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lack of the workers’ input on their working conditions and incomes, and the lack of rewards. “The labor 
force endured low wages, few bonuses, ungenerous pensions, long workweeks, poor living conditions, 
and a general sense of powerlessness,” Bachman explained250. Ceausescu attempted to spur productivity 
by implementing different payment systems – a move that resulted in more apathy and demoralization of 
the working force. However, the resistance to such measures rarely actively manifested in the form of 
riots or mobilization, but rather passively in the form of sloppiness or lack of discipline, and the workers 
felt alienated from those who were supposed to defend their interests. In the 1970s, a survey of 6,200 
Romanian workers revealed that more than 63% did not feel their union was representing them251. Solid 
strikes and demonstrations appeared only in the late 1980s. 
The most organized labor movement in Romania was the pro-government miners, who frequently came to 
Bucharest to support Iliescu’s regime and spread terror and fear in the streets of the capital in order to 
silence the opposition.  
In summary, regarding the strength of labor movements in Poland and Romania, the former enjoyed 
strong labor unions and movements, while the latter rather suffered from a weak labor movement, which 
could be explanatory for the presence or absence of violence in each case. 
Violence 
Poland and Romania had witnessed different levels of violence prior to the uprisings in 1989. Since even 
before World War II, Romania had been suffering from violence under the Iron Guard – violence that was 
mainly directed against resistance and opposition to the ruling regime. Between 1946 and 1989, around 
617,000 political prisoners were detained, while 120,000 of them died in labor camps252. Poland as well 
had its fair share of violence, but it is barely comparable to what was happening in Romania. The violence 
in Poland was also rather directed at Jews returning from concentration camps after the war had ended, 
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reaching a peak in 1946, when a pogrom killed 42 people253. One reason for the use of violence in 
Romania, specifically during the uprising, was explained by Roberts, stating: “Some of the violence of the 
events in Romania […] can be attributed to the fact that the Ceausescu regime, being more nationalistic 
and independent of the Soviet Union than most others in Eastern Europe were at the time, could not be 
restrained from using extreme violence by Moscow to anything like the same degree as the regimes in 
East Germany or Czechoslovakia.”254 
Duration of democratization 
While Poland and Romania are considered flawed democracies, the former ranks higher in The 
Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2015, as it achieved higher scores in electoral processes 
and pluralism, functioning of the government and political participation. The difference in ranks is not 
significant enough to be considered crucial in terms of the duration of the democratization process.  
The Polity IV Project dataset, which assesses political regime characteristics and transitions from 1800 
until 2006, evaluates democracies in different countries on an eleven-point scale (from 0-10) through the 
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders, the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. Countries ranked below 
6 are considered anocracies, meaning incoherent authority regimes, while those who score 6 and above 
are considered fully institutionalized democracies255. The results of the examination of this specific 
variable in the study show that while both Romania and Poland’s scores in terms of democratic 
institutionalization are increasing over the years, Romania seems to democratize at a slower pace than 
Poland256. Hence, the comparison of both cases supports the hypothesis regarding the duration of the 
democratization process after mass uprisings. Romania, being the violent example, seems to be evolving 
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at a slower pace than Poland, and was considered a democracy years after Poland had already 
democratized. 
 
Figure 1: Visualization of the Polity IV Project DEMOC variable257 
Voter turnout and voter inclusiveness 
In terms of voter turnout, both countries have been subtly declining, with minor fluctuations (Appendix 1 
and 2). However, when looking at the inclusiveness in terms of voter base in the parliamentary elections 
after the 1989 Polish uprising, it is noticeable that the parliaments consisted of various factions. In his 
paper “Poland’s three parliaments in the era of transition, 1989-1995”, Jerzy J. Wiatr looks at the 
composition of the three parliaments that followed the uprising. He describes the post-uprising timeframe 
as witnessing a “relatively long period of power-sharing”. He states that the first parliament from 1989-
1991 was not necessarily representative, as Solidarity won 35% of the parliamentary seats258. The second 
parliamentary round from 1991-1993 suffered from fragmentation, and the third from 1993-1995 lacked 
the presence of right-wing parties “due to their failure to reach the required electoral threshold”259. 
Although the term “fragmentation” is accompanied by the verb “paralyzed” in Wiatr’s paper, it does 
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highlight inclusiveness in voter demographics in terms of political affiliation, possibly emphasizing that 
voters from different political factions and ideologies participated in the elections. One may look even 
further than the elections of 1993. In 2015, Poland’s conservative, opposition Law and Justice Party had 
won the parliamentary elections, getting the majority of seats – this was the first time that a single party 
would be able to govern Poland alone since 1989, and the first time there was no left-wing presence in the 
parliament260. Hence, inclusiveness in the elections was, and still is present in Poland.  
In Romania, as opposed to Poland, the parliamentary and presidential elections of May 1990 were 
surrounded by several intimidation and harassment campaigns against nominees from the opposition. 
These campaigns included violence, threats, harassment and assassination attempts, mainly against 
presidential candidates and the headquarters of opposition parties. Reports state that between January and 
early May, “133 [Peasant] party officials had been seriously injured, 388 beaten while inside party offices 
located throughout the country, 189 party members attacked in their own homes and two party canvassers 
killed”261. Besides the pre-election violence, campaigning was difficult for members of the opposition, as 
most voters depended on the state-owned television in order to be informed about the elections and the 
candidates. Iliscieu won the presidential elections by 85% and the Front witnessed a 67% victory in 
Senate and Deputy elections, while reports of fraud circulated262. Despite this being the first multi-party 
elections in Romania, it comes to show that voting for any other party than the Front was a difficult and 
threatening task. Given the election results, it is clear that the voter base was not diversified, possibly due 
to the intimidation campaigns that preceded the elections, the fragmentation of the opposition, people’s 
fear of change263 and the lack of awareness amongst voters, putting the meaningfulness of the elections 
into question.  
Hence, when looking at the inclusiveness of the elections’ voter pool, the discrepancy between both 
countries cannot be overseen. While Poland had remained peaceful throughout the uprising and its 
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following elections, Romania had been plagued with violence, which had led to a diversified voter pool 
and parliament in the first country and a one-party majority parliament in the second. 
Country Violence Year of election Inclusiveness in parliament 
Poland No 1989 Yes 
Romania Yes 1990 No 
Table 1: Inclusiveness in post-1989 parliaments in Poland and Romania  
However, there is another variable that highlights a main difference between Poland and Romania: the 
strength of the civil society in each country. While Romania had a very weak civil society by the time the 
anti-authoritarian mass uprising broke out, Poland had enjoyed a very strong civil society which was 
being established for decades before it carried the anti-authoritarian mass uprising forward. Whether this 
variable overrides the variable of violence is questionable, but that will not be examined in this paper. 
In summary, comparing the cases of Poland and Romania lead to the following main findings: 
1. Regarding the duration of the democratization process:  
Poland, which had experienced a nonviolent uprising, ranks higher in the Economist’s 
Democracy Index than Romania, which had witnessed a violent uprising. Additionally, Poland 
progress in the democratization process was faster than Romania’s, according to the Polity IV 
Project. Hence, Poland’s democratization process has been faster and more efficient than that of 
Romania. 
2. Regarding the voter turnout and election inclusiveness: 
Poland’s parliaments after the 1989 uprising and up until 2015 were distinguished by multiplicity 
and lacked an absolute majority, indicating the participation of a diversified voter pool. 
Romania’s presidential and parliamentary elections, on the other hand, showed absolute majority 
parliaments and absolute majority presidential victories, indicating a lack of inclusiveness. 
Romania also witnessed intimidation and harassment campaigns during the elections, and a 
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significant portion of its population believes that living under Communist rule was better than 
today. 
The following chapter will examine the Medium N cases of this thesis – Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia – and evaluate how the variables of the hypothesis are affected by violence or the 
lack of it in each country. 
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Chapter IV: Medium N cases – Review of cases with similar background and 
evaluation of their development in terms of voter turnout and inclusiveness, and 
duration of democratization (Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) 
While the previous section singled out two cases that mainly differed in the amount of violence used 
during the transition period from communism to democratization, this section will look at cases that had 
endured similar circumstances when talking about socioeconomic structures and communist rule, and at 
how they had developed in the process of democratization, voter turnout and inclusiveness. The countries 
examined in this section are Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (which later was divided into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia).  
Hungary 
The Hungarian People’s Republic became the Republic of Hungary in October 1989. Hungary had 
previously attempted to overthrow the Soviet grip on the nation in 1956 with student protests, hoping to 
step out of the Warsaw Pact; however, those dreams were crushed – along with the killing of 25,000 
people264 – when Red Army tanks took over the streets of Budapest once again265. Communist power was 
restored, and leaders of the 1956 revolution were executed. Mikhail Gorbachev, who was the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union back then, had started 
applying restructuring policies in the 1980s, specifically in Hungary, adding flexibility to the structure of 
the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party which was led by János Kádár. In 1986, demonstrations 
swept the country, mainly due to the ill-treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The party was 
very much involved in talks with the opposition, giving the reformist communists in Hungary the chance 
to peacefully take over the party in 1989 and oust Kádár. So-called “democratic stability”266 ensued in 
Hungary over the coming months, and the communist party kept losing in the elections.  
                                                     
264 (East 1992) 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid. 
61 
 
The transition was not violent and no casualties were witnessed. In regards to the duration of the 
democratization process, Hungary was still considered a flawed democracy in 2015267 at rank 54, with its 
main strength being the electoral process and pluralism, and its main weakness being political 
participation. The voter turnout for parliamentary elections averaged at 65%268 269 since the transition, 
barely higher than that of Romania (62%), which had witnessed remarkably more violence during the fall 
of its communist regime.  
Bulgaria 
Ever since the Communist regime took hold of Bulgaria in the 1940s, it had been accompanied by 
violence mainly directed at its opposition and human rights advocates, and specifically against the 
Turkish minority, which was either killed or forced to immigrate in an attempt to “bulgarize” the 
country270. The anti-authoritarian mass uprising and transition itself in 1989 was not necessarily violent, 
but the preceding era had proven itself to be prone to use force to kill, torture, sentence to death, imprison 
or displace members of the opposition and the Turkish minority. Throughout the Communists’ grip on 
Bulgaria, 1,500 people were killed at the iron curtain in the area271. The constitution had given the ruling 
Communist party overruling rights and power. As then-general secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev launched his era of reforms in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, 
Bulgarians started demanding more openness and democratization272. Communist leader of Bulgaria 
Todor Zhikov was forced to resign in November 1989, as internal party rivalries and ongoing protests in 
the streets called for the end of the Communist regime and a transition to democracy, as well as an 
improvement of economic conditions. Society in itself was divided between the elderly generation 
advocating for socialism. The Communist party renamed itself to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and 
its opposition came in form of a coalition under the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The BSP won 
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the first parliamentary elections in 1990, while the UDF succeeded in the parliamentary elections of 1991 
– but they did not last long. Demonstrations escalated again in 1997, also dubbed as the “real turning 
point of the anticommunist revolution”273, and resulted in the recently formed United Democratic Forces’ 
victory. Throughout the anti-authoritarian mass uprising and up until 1997, violence was contained.  
Until 2015, Bulgaria is still considered a flawed democracy according the Democracy Index, ranking 46, 
with its strength lying in electoral process and pluralism and weakness in political culture. Parliamentary 
elections in Bulgaria averaged at 63.1%274 since 1991, with an exceptional high of 84% and 75% in 1991 
and 1994 respectively, which quickly subsided in 1997 to about 59%. Presidential elections averaged at 
54.3%275 since 1992, skyrocketing at the beginning with 75%, but quickly dropping to 50% in 1996276. 
These numbers represent the enthusiastic hype in elections after the fall of the communist regime, which 
was previously explained.  
Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia’s way out from Communist rule through the so-called Velvet Revolution and its so-called 
‘divorce’ later on were very peaceful endeavors. While it started out with the police beating student 
demonstrators in November 1989, the remainder of the anti-authoritarian mass uprising passed without 
major violent occurrences and no deaths. Inspired by the example of East Germany, Czechoslovakians all 
over the country protested against the police’s actions against the students, quickly followed by the 
formation of the Civic Forum in Prague and the Public Against Violence in Bratislava277 in an attempt to 
negotiate with the government. Opposition had snowballed in the last two years of Communist rule 
amongst independent organizations, the intellectuals and the elite. After 21 days, the Communist 
government resigned without the loss of any lives, and Václav Havel was elected president in December 
1989. From 1990 until 1993, the country was completely reformed in terms of political and economic 
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structure. Given ethnic issues, Czechoslovakia broke into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic – 
again, without any violence278.  
The Czech Republic is considered a flawed democracy, ranking 25th worldwide. Its strengths lie in the 
electoral process and pluralism, as well as civil liberties. Its weakness is the political participation of its 
citizens279. Parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic averaged at 71.97%280 281 since 1990. Only one 
presidential election took place from 1989 until today, which had a voter turnout of 59.08%282. 
Slovakia is also considered a flawed democracy at rank 43, excelling at electoral process and pluralism 
and lagging behind in political culture and political participation283. Parliamentary elections in Slovakia 
witnessed a voter turnout of 71.46%284 285 from 1990 until 2016, and an average turnout of 55.26% in 
presidential elections from 1999 until 2014. 
Despite Czechoslovakia’s peaceful transition and division, the emerging countries did not rank much 
better than Romania or any other East European country that had gone through the process violently. 
Duration of democratization 
To compare the duration of the democratization process between the Medium-N cases, I will refer once 
again to the Polity IV Project Democracy score throughout different periods of evaluation (POE). 
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Figure 2: Values of DEMOC variable in Polity IV Project dataset286 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which all witnessed a peaceful uprising, went through a faster 
democratization process, while Bulgaria’s pace of democratization was slower after its violent uprising in 
1989. 
Voter turnout and inclusiveness 
Hungary’s first parliament after its 1989 uprisings consisted of mainly six major parties: the Alliance of 
Free Democrats (21.3%), the Alliance of Young Democrats (8.9%), the Christian Democratic People’s 
Party (6.5%), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (24.7%), the Hungarian Socialist Party (10.9%) and the 
Independent Smallholders and Citizens Party (11.7%)287. It also included one seat for the agrarian alliance 
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(3%)288. With no absolute majority, the election implies that the voters came from different backgrounds 
and political mindsets, assuring inclusiveness in the voter pool. 
In Bulgaria, the parliament of 1991 consisted of three major movements: the Union of Democratic Forces 
(34.36%), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (33.14%) and the Movements for Rights and Freedoms 
(7.55%)289. Although there was no party with an absolute majority, the first Bulgarian parliament after the 
anti-authoritarian mass uprising was much less diverse and inclusive than those of Poland or Hungary, 
consequently showing a lack of inclusiveness in the voter pool. 
Czechoslovakia’s post-1989 parliament consisted of members of six movements: The Civic Forum – 
Public against Violence (46.6%), the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (13.6%), the Christian 
Democratic Union / Christian Democratic Movement (12%), the Movement for Self-Governing 
Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia (5.4%), the Slovak National Party (3.5%) and Coexistence 
(2.8%)290. Without no absolute majority and more parties voted into the Chamber of the People than in 
Bulgaria and Romania, the peaceful transition in Czechoslovakia was followed by a parliamentary 
election that included voters from various political ideologies. 
Country Violence Year of election Inclusiveness in parliament 
Hungary No 1990 Yes 
Bulgaria Yes 1991 No 
Czechoslovakia No 1990 Yes 
Table 2: Inclusiveness in post-1989 parliaments in Eastern Europe 
The following chapter will lay out the main points of comparison and findings that emerged while 
examining and deep diving into the case studies. 
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Chapter V: Comparison and Findings 
In order to compare all cases in this study, the table below summarizes all statistics known so far.  
Country Violence 
Duration of 
democratization 
(compared to 
other countries) 
Inclusiveness of 
elections in post-1989 
uprising 
Supports 
hypothesis 
Poland No Faster Yes Yes 
Romania Yes Slower No Yes 
Hungary No Faster Yes Yes 
Bulgaria Yes Slower No Yes 
Czechoslovakia No Faster Yes Yes 
Table 3: Overview of variable statistics concerning the case-studies 
The variables discussed in this thesis are violence, duration of democratization, voter turnout, and 
inclusiveness of elections. As Table 3 shows, all cases support the hypothesis that the more violence 
occurs during a mass uprising, the slower the democratization process and the lower the inclusiveness of 
the elections. For this, the thesis examined five Eastern European, post-war countries that had been 
similar in geography, social constructs, political systems, and history, but different in terms of the amount 
of violence they faced during the uprisings against Communism in 1989. In order to look into each 
variable in a more detailed manner, the following subsections discuss the findings and data used for each 
dependent variable. 
1. Duration of the democratization process: 
Since all of the countries are still considered flawed democracies, the duration of democratization for all 
of them is still ongoing. In that manner the hypothesis could not be fully supported or refuted depending 
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only on this index, as it considers the conclusion of the democratization period once the country is 
considered a full democracy. However, looking at the countries rank in the Democracy Index shows that 
the countries which had endured a violent uprising rank lower than the others.  
Country Rank in 2006 Category in 2006 Rank in 2015 Category in 2015 
Czech Republic 18 Full Democracy 25 Flawed Democracy 
Slovakia 41 Flawed Democracy 43 Flawed Democracy 
Hungary 38 Flawed Democracy 54 Flawed Democracy 
Poland 46 Flawed Democracy 48 Flawed Democracy 
Bulgaria 49 Flawed Democracy 46 Flawed Democracy 
Romania 50 Flawed Democracy 59 Flawed Democracy 
Table 4: Overview of democracy statistics in 2006 and 2015 concerning the case-studies 
On the other hand, when relying on the Polity IV Project dataset, the duration and pace of 
democratization in each case shows that Hungary was the fastest to democratize, followed by Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania respectively. Given that Bulgaria and Romania are the 
two cases that witnessed violent mass uprisings, this supports the hypothesis. Figure 3 below clearly 
demonstrates how the democratization process has been slower in Bulgaria and Romania than the other 
examined countries. 
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Figure 3: Values of DEMOC variable in Polity IV Project dataset291 
2. Inclusiveness in elections: 
Based on the outcome of the parliamentary elections of each of the cases examined after the 1989 
uprisings, it has become evident that the parliaments of countries that did not undergo violence during 
their rebellion against the Communist regime were more diverse and included members of more parties 
than the others. In the case of Romania, it was evident that violent campaigns of harassment and 
intimidation were executed in continuation of the violence that took place during the uprising. The 
violence also fed the lack of autonomy among the Romanian population and the minorities in the country, 
causing tension, and allegedly led to an absolute majority in parliament. Although Romania had nine 
movements in its 1990 parliament, the absolute majority achieved by the National Salvation Front shows 
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that the majority of those who believed in the process and went to vote had a certain political affiliation or 
ideology, while the others were harassed and threatened, and while members of the opposition also faced 
similar fates. Table 5 compares between the five countries examined in this thesis in terms of 
inclusiveness of elections.  
Country Violence 
Year of 
election 
Absolute 
majority 
achieved 
Number of 
movements 
represented 
Inclusiveness 
in parliament 
Poland No 1989 No 7 Yes 
Romania Yes 1990 Yes 9 No 
Hungary No 1990 No 6 Yes 
Bulgaria Yes 1991 No 3 No 
Czechoslovakia No 1990 No 6 Yes 
Table 5: Inclusiveness in parliamentary elections  
3. Other findings: 
Going through the statistics, there are several findings and conclusions that can be reached that are not 
necessarily connected to the hypothesis. These include:  
1.  Although the Czech Republic had a nonviolent anti-authoritarian mass uprising and transition, it 
moved from being a full democracy in 2005 to a flawed democracy in 2016, showing that even 
though it seems like it had taken a shorter time to democratize, the democratization itself was not 
very sustainable and consolidated. Additionally, its rank in the Polity IV Project dropped in 2006 
from 10 to 9. 
2. All the examined cases dropped in their democracy rank between 2005 and 2015, showing that 
even those who had been close to fully democratize had failed to do so, especially Hungary. 
70 
 
3. The amount of violence that occurs during a mass uprising does not necessarily affect the voter 
turnout as a whole. According to the cases looked at here, voter turnout in parliamentary elections 
in Poland, which is considered an extremely nonviolent example, falls way below Romania and 
Bulgaria. Additionally, the voter turnout in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are also 
not that high compared to countries that had gone through violent anti-authoritarian mass 
uprisings. When looking at the voter turnout of the presidential elections, Romania actually 
scores highest among all cases.  
Country Violence 
Voter Turnout  Parliamentary 
Elections 
Voter Turnout  Presidential 
Elections 
Poland No 49.5% 57.4% 
Romania Yes 62% 62% 
Hungary No 65% NA 
Bulgaria Yes 63.1% 54.3% 
Czech Republic 
No 
71.97% 59.08% 
Slovakia 71.46% 55.26% 
Table 6: Voter turnout in parliamentary and presidential elections 
4. It is noticeable that the voter turnout in presidential elections in most cases is significantly lower 
than in parliamentary elections.  
5. When taking a deeper look at the exact rankings of the case studies in the Economist Democracy 
Index 2015, the following becomes noticeable292: 
                                                     
292 Highlighted countries are those that had experienced violence. 
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  Rank 
Overall 
Score 
Electoral 
Process and 
Pluralism 
Functioning 
of 
Government 
Political 
Participation 
Political 
Culture 
Civil 
Liberties 
Czech 
Republic 
25 7.94 9.58 7.14 6.67 6.88 9.41 
Slovakia 43 7.29 9.58 7.5 5.56 5 8.82 
Bulgaria 46 7.14 9.17 6.07 7.22 5 8.24 
Poland 48 7.09 9.58 5.71 6.67 4.38 7.35 
Hungary 54 6.84 9.17 6.07 4.44 6.88 7.65 
Romania 59 6.68 9.17 5.71 5 5 8.53 
Table 7: Overview of democracy statistics concerning the case-studies293 
 Romania and Bulgaria both rank low in Electoral Process and Pluralism and Functioning of 
Government, compared to the nonviolent cases. 
 Romania ranks low in Political Participation, supporting the hypothesis. 
 Bulgaria ranks high in Political Participation, refuting the hypothesis. 
 Romania and Bulgaria rank average in Political Culture and Civil Liberties.  
All in all, the examined cases support the hypothesis. This shows that the amount of violence during mass 
uprisings does affect the democratization process and the inclusiveness of elections during and after the 
transition period.  
The following chapter will bring the findings to a conclusion and look at recommendations for future 
research, as well as limitations of this thesis.  
  
                                                     
293 Violent cases highlighted in grey. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
Nonviolence should not be glorified by scholars, as Gay Seidman294 and Kurt Schock295 stated, but how 
right were they? The cases examined in this thesis prove that the duration of the democratization process 
and the inclusiveness of elections are affected by the violence that took place during the countries’ 
transition periods. But Seidman and Schock do have a point – scholars have been bound to propagate 
nonviolence, making it seem like the general trend of the discipline of nonviolent uprisings and 
democratization relies on the principled nonviolence approach. It seems like the majority of scholars 
focused on advocating nonviolence, rather than examine it. While Chenoweth and Stephan would not 
agree to that statement given their pragmatic nonviolence approach, it is safe to say that in their study, the 
scholars looked at the success of the toppling of regimes, not necessarily the democratization and 
consolidation process. Here it is important to define “success”. 
While this thesis would definitely fall under the umbrella of propagating nonviolent tools of political 
behavior, not everything that shines is actually gold. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 
2015 report states that “Eastern Europe does not have a single ‘full democracy’, as some of the region’s 
most politically developed nations, such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, have 
suffered bouts of political instability and popular support for democracy is surprisingly low”296. 
One cannot deny that the examined cases that had more peaceful transitions ranked higher in terms of 
quality of democracy than those who had been subject to violence. However, almost all cases in this study 
had a main point of weakness in their democracies, namely the political participation of its citizens, 
according to the Democracy Index 2015. Hence, although it seems like an instant glorification of 
nonviolent uprisings is in order, one should not overestimate the effectiveness of nonviolent mass 
uprisings that aim to move from authoritarian to democratic regimes.  
                                                     
294 (Seidman 2000) 
295 (Schock 2003)  
296 (The Economist 2015) 
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Although Europe is considered a continent in which most democratic nations are located, it seems that 
complete democratization has not been attainable to many of them. Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary each have their own setbacks which they had experienced over and over 
again ever since the fall of the Communist bloc in 1989.  
I would like to conclude this thesis by two quotes of political analyst Noam Chomsky. The first is: “Non-
violent resistance activities cannot succeed against an enemy that is able freely to use violence. […] You 
can't have non-violent resistance against the Nazis in a concentration camp.”297 
The second is: “Mass non-violent protest is predicated on the humanity of the oppressor. Quite often it 
doesn't work. Sometimes it does, in unexpected ways. But judgements about that would have to be based 
on intimate knowledge of the society and its various strands.”298  
These quotes indicate the need to culturally, economically and societally understand and differentiate 
between countries in order to correctly assess whether nonviolent anti-authoritarian mass uprisings would 
be able to efficiently oust authoritarian regimes. This means that the efficiency of nonviolent mass 
uprising and political participation tools cannot be generalized across the globe. 
Limitations 
One major limitation of this thesis is the lack of reliable data about the quality and duration of democracy 
before 1989, in relation to the case studies. This is mainly due to the Communist restrictions of public 
opinion polls and surveys, as well as assessments of the political systems and voter behavior in countries 
of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe after World War II until the mass uprisings of 1989. Hence, it 
was difficult to dig up data and statistics that correctly and effectively portrayed the situation prior to the 
transitions brought about by the uprisings. This specifically refers to the case of Romania, in which the 
state’s security apparatus rigorously censored and – for the lack of a better expression – kept the lid on 
                                                     
297 (Chomsky and Barsamian 1992) 
298 (Becker 2008) 
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research by civil society organizations and other entities that did not comply to the official, political 
institutions in place at the time. 
Another limitation is the lack of violent mass uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1989. Romania and Bulgaria 
were the only countries that effectively witnessed violence before and during 1989. Consequently, the 
case studies were limited to the two mentioned countries and three examples of nonviolent uprisings, 
namely Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The amount of the latter was limited in order to ensure a 
balanced comparison and analysis. 
Recommendations 
For future research, it would be beneficial to expand on the number of cases and conduct regional case 
studies, with focus on anti-authoritarian mass uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa and Latin 
America. Although this thesis projects that a correlation may exist between the amount of violence and 
the duration of democratization and the inclusiveness of elections, it would add if future researchers 
looked at it from a more qualitative perspective and establish indices that measure the manifestation of 
violence’s psychological impact in political behavior as a whole.  
Additionally, while the Economist’s Democracy Index is the easiest to obtain, its methodology and 
definitions do not necessarily coincide with how most researchers would label “full” or “flawed” 
democracies. Its reliance on public opinion surveys and official, governmental statistics on voter turnout 
comes to seem most logic, but not most accurate. History has over and over again proven how 
governments can manipulate statistics regarding political behavior, not just voter turnout. Additionally, 
relying on public opinion surveys in countries when available seems to make sense; however, referring to 
public opinion surveys of similar countries when the surveys for the country are not available seems a 
very far stretch. Unfortunately, the index is as close to reality as any other available source or ranking on 
democracy and its quality. 
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In the end, it is important to not glorify nonviolence with a sense of advocacy when conducting researches 
about the matter. While it is understandable that people tend to believe that the world would be a better 
place if violence diminished, the core of our science is to examine what happens in reality, not what 
happens in our imagination of a better world.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: 
Voter turnout in Poland (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Year Voter Turnout Type of Election 
1989 62.11% Parliamentary 
1990 53.40% Presidential 
1991 43.20% Parliamentary 
1993 52.08% Parliamentary 
1995 68.23% Presidential 
1997 47.93% Parliamentary 
2000 61.12% Presidential 
2001 46.18% Parliamentary 
2005 50.99% Presidential 
2005 40.57% Parliamentary 
2007 53.88% Parliamentary 
2010 55.31% Presidential 
2011 48.92% Parliamentary 
2015 55.34% Presidential 
2015 50.92% Parliamentary 
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Appendix 2: 
Voter turnout in Romania (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Year Voter Turnout Type of Election 
1990 79.69% Parliamentary 
1992 76.29% Parliamentary 
1996 75.90% Presidential 
1996 76.01% Parliamentary 
2000 56.62% Presidential 
2000 65.31% Parliamentary 
2004 55.21% Presidential 
2004 58.51% Parliamentary 
2008 39.20% Parliamentary 
2009 58.02% Presidential 
2012 41.76% Parliamentary 
2014 64.11% Presidential 
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Appendix 3:  
Rankings and scores of Poland and Romania in the Democracy Index 2015, published by The Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 
 Rank 
Overall 
Score 
Electoral 
Process and 
Pluralism 
Functioning 
of 
Government 
Political 
Participation 
Political 
Culture 
Civil 
Liberties 
Poland 48 7.09 9.58 5.71 6.67 4.38 7.35 
Romania 59 6.68 9.17 5.71 5.00 5.00 8.53 
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Appendix 4: 
Rankings and scores of Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria in the Democracy Index 2015, 
published by The Economist Intelligence Unit. 
 Rank 
Overall 
Score 
Electoral 
Process and 
Pluralism 
Functioning 
of 
Government 
Political 
Participation 
Political 
Culture 
Civil 
Liberties 
Czech 
Republic 
25 7.94 9.58 7.14 6.67 6.88 9.41 
Slovakia 43 7.29 9.58 7.50 5.56 5.00 8.82 
Bulgaria 46 7.14 9.17 6.07 7.22 5.00 8.24 
Hungary 54 6.84 9.17 6.07 4.44 6.88 7.65 
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Appendix 5: 
Voter turnout in Hungary (parliamentary elections), as published by the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Year Voter Turnout 
1990 65.10% 
1994 68.92% 
1998 57.01% 
2002 70.52% 
2006 67.57% 
2010 64.38% 
2014 61.84% 
 
  
94 
 
Appendix 6: 
Voter turnout in Bulgaria (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Year Voter Turnout Type of Election 
1991 83.87% Parliamentary 
1992 75.17% Presidential 
1994 75.23% Parliamentary 
1996 49.79% Presidential 
1997 58.87% Parliamentary 
2001 66.63% Parliamentary 
2001 54.92% Presidential 
2005 55.76% Parliamentary 
2006 42.62% Presidential 
2009 60.64% Parliamentary 
2011 48.25% Presidential 
2013 52.49% Parliamentary 
2014 51.05% Parliamentary 
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Appendix 7: 
Voter turnout in the Czech Republic (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Year Voter Turnout Type of Election 
1990 96.33% Parliamentary 
1992 84.68% Parliamentary 
1996 76.29% Parliamentary 
1998 74% Parliamentary 
2002 57.95% Parliamentary 
2006 64.47% Parliamentary 
2010 62.6% Parliamentary 
2013 59.48% Parliamentary 
2013 59.08% Presidential 
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Appendix 8: 
Voter turnout in the Czech Republic (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Year Voter Turnout Type of Election 
1990 96.33% Parliamentary 
1992 84.68% Parliamentary 
1994 75.41% Parliamentary 
1998 84.25% Parliamentary 
1999 75.42% Presidential 
2002 70.07% Parliamentary 
2004 43.48% Presidential 
2006 54.67% Parliamentary 
2009 51.67% Presidential 
2010 58.84% Parliamentary 
2012 59.11% Parliamentary 
2014 50.48% Presidential 
2016 59.82% Parliamentary 
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Appendix 9: 
Detailed table of the DEMOC variable for case studies (Poland and Romania): 
Year Poland Romania 
1987-1988 
0 
0 1988-1989 
1989-1990 
5 
1990-1991 
5 
1991-1992 
8 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
9 
1996-1997 
8 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
2002-2003 
10 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
9 2005-2006 
2006-2007 
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Appendix 10: 
Detailed table of the DEMOC variable for Medium N cases (Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia): 
Year Hungary 
Czech 
Republic 
Slovakia Bulgaria 
1987-1988 0 
0 0 0 1988-1989 2 
1989-1990 0 
1990-1991 
10 
8 8 
8 
1991-1992 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
10 
7 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
1996-1997 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
9 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
9 
2002-2003 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
2005-2006 
2006-2007 9 10 
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Appendix 11: 
Average of scores of violent and nonviolent cases in this thesis in the DEMOC variable: 
Year Non-violent cases Violent cases 
1987-1988 0 
0 1988-1989 0.5 
1989-1990 1.25 
1990-1991 7.75 
6.5 
1991-1992 
8.5 
1992-1993 
1993-1994 
8.75 
1994-1995 
1995-1996 
9 1996-1997 
8 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
9.5 
1999-2000 
2000-2001 
2001-2002 
8.5 2002-2003 
9.75 
2003-2004 
2004-2005 
9 2005-2006 
2006-2007 
 
